Viking Sky survivors

[just_dont]

I seem to recall a post long ago from the Chief (@chengkp75 ) stating that if oil levels were too high in rough seas, that it could result in oil spray within the engine, and that THAT could result in sensors causing an engine to shut down.

I agree the levels seemed quite low relative to the manufacturer's recommendations. But it's worth noting that 100% is actually well above the maximum recommended fill level. They don't want them filled to 100%.

It would be interesting to learn the rationale for the levels employed by Viking that day on the Sky and whether that was SOP for all Viking ships at the time.

 

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[DaveSJ711]

7 minutes ago, Heidi13 said:

The responsibility for ensuring all machinery is operational, in accordance with the company's Safety Management System is the Senior Engineering Officer of the Watch. He/she is then responsible to the Chief Engineer, who oversees the entire Engineering Plant. When equipment is non-operational to the required standard the SMS will have clear reporting procedures.

 

As a Captain, I had no idea the quantity of oil in each M/E Lub Oil Tank, but prior to commencing daily operations I had a call with the Chief Engineer when we would discuss the status of the Engine Room, especially any deficiencies and how they could impact the safe operation of the vessel. The Chief Engineer makes recommendations and the Master can accept them, or decide an alternative option. I will also discuss any potential operational risks with the Chief Engineer - weather, current, traffic (fishing fleet), etc.

 

Drilling down to determine why the oil level were so low can be a long process, as depending on answers provided to the initial questions, the investigators may end up drilling down multiple levels, and opening multiple new avenues of investigation. Personally, with the level of detail provided in the SMS of my previous company, I find it beyond comprehension how they could be so low. I am not aware of any facts being posted that would assist in determining why they were so low, nor who could be responsible.

 

In addition to thoroughly investigating the reasons for low oil, I expect to see feedback on the Ship Manager's SMS. While approved by Flag/Class, is it consistent with the standards of other cruise ship operators. Most cruise lines and major ferry companies have SMS's significantly above the minimum standards outlined in the ISM Code.

 

If these operational levels were in accordance with the Ship Manager's SMS, then in all probability they were used by all vessels managed by this Ship Manager, which includes the entire Viking Fleet. However, I expect this will be covered in the final report.

 

Are actual oil levels checked manually during a ship's voyage?  Alternatively, does the ship record this information electronically and log it somewhere for regular staff review? 

 

Without having any technical expertise here, it seems reasonable to assume that, if the delta were so great on March 23-24, then a delta of some sort would likely have occurred once or more before the incident (unless the March 23-24 reading represented a sudden and aberrant event).  Using the analogy of my older car, the oil level rarely declines so suddenly that the oil reservoir is full one day and near-empty the next.  Multiple data points are available -- assuming I check the oil regularly -- that tell me whether I have an imminent problem.

 

I wonder if multiple data points were similarly available on the Sky.  If they were, and if they showed a steady or sudden decline in the ship's oil level, then why didn't somebody recognize a potential problem and do something about it before the problem exploded?  

 

    

[DaveSJ711]

57 minutes ago, just_dont said:

I seem to recall a post long ago from the Chief (@chengkp75 ) stating that if oil levels were too high in rough seas, that it could result in oil spray within the engine, and that THAT could result in sensors causing an engine to shut down.

I agree the levels seemed quite low relative to the manufacturer's recommendations. But it's worth noting that 100% is actually well above the maximum recommended fill level. They don't want them filled to 100%.

It would be interesting to learn the rationale for the levels employed by Viking that day on the Sky and whether that was SOP for all Viking ships at the time.

 

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The interim report states that "the diesel generators shut down as a result of the loss of lubricating oil suction due to low sump tank levels [28-40% capacity], combined with pitching and rolling."  The report further states:  "All vessel owners and operators are recommended to ensure that engine lubrication oil tank levels are maintained in accordance with engine manufacturer instructions and topped up in the event of poor weather being forecast."

[just_dont]

 
The interim report states that "the diesel generators shut down as a result of the loss of lubricating oil suction due to low sump tank levels [28-40% capacity], combined with pitching and rolling."  The report further states:  "All vessel owners and operators are recommended to ensure that engine lubrication oil tank levels are maintained in accordance with engine manufacturer instructions and topped up in the event of poor weather being forecast."

Oh, I know - I too read the report. I also read all 5000+ posts from the original thread that started very shortly after the mayday was called, and I'm just recalling something the Chief had posted back then when everyone was wondering what could have caused the engines to shut down. And my recollection was that too much oil in heavy seas could actually be a cause.
Please don't get the impression that I in any way support the decision to allow the levels to have been that low, but I can't imagine they would have done so without some rationale, however wrong it may have been in hindsight.

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[chengkp75]

I'll do some catching up on this thread.

 

First, as for the inoperable #3 DG.  This engine had a failure, and the failure was being repaired at the time of the incident.  The ship still had 75% of full power available, which is sufficient to safely navigate the ship.  As for those questioning whether a ship is "safe" to sail without one engine, the answer is yes, as long as it has one engine, any ship is "seaworthy", and passenger vessels now must have two available at all times to meet the Safe Return to Port regulations.  Diesel engines are torn down completely and overhauled every 12,000 running hours (about every 2 years), and this overhaul takes about 2-3 weeks, so the nearly every cruise ship spends a significant amount of each year cruising along with one engine in pieces in the engine room, and the passengers are blithely unaware.  Cruise itineraries are designed to only require full power rarely, and when overhauls are scheduled, they are set even more strictly for speed needed between ports.  Why was the engine down for a week, possibly before the MAN rep arrived to make the repair?  Perhaps the ship needed to get a new turbo, or parts, and there was no need to have the tech rep onboard if the parts necessary for the repair were not there.

 

Now to lube oil levels.  What the report doesn't say is whether or not the lowered oil levels were "the norm" for the ship, or whether it was an anomaly.  Even Viking's decision to review lube oil management procedures does not necessarily mean that this was a fleetwide norm, or even the norm for this ship, but only that the company feels that tighter control needs to be implemented.  While operating with a lower oil level is not "industry best practices", the engines were operating without a low oil level alarm, and that alarm is set by the manufacturer, with a healthy safety margin.  The alarms going off and clearing after a few seconds is not unusual in heavy weather, as the level sensor is only at one side/end of the sump tank, and that tank may be 2 meters wide and 6 meters long, so there will be significant sloshing.  And, as I stated on the earlier thread, overfilling a sump tank can lead to oil mist in the crankcase, and an engine shutdown from sloshing in heavy weather (I had one last week, and the sump tank wasn't overfilled, just a whole lot of rolling and pitching caused the oil mist).  The 10m3 of oil used to fill the engines surely did come from a storage tank, and that was certainly not exhausted when this was done.  That amount, among 3 engines, is about right to bring the oil level from the reported levels to the high recommended level.  Marine engines have very large oil capacities, to allow for things like sloshing in heavy weather, and you typically don't add oil until you are down a significant amount (500-1000 liters), as the measuring means is crude at best.  The lowered oil level, while significant, is not a "damning" fact.  It merely means that the company needs to revisit their policies on this.  While I would personally and professionally would not have operated engines at this oil level, at least for an extended period, and as I've said, it isn't best practices, it is fairly common.  I can see reasons for a lowered oil level, but again without knowing the exact dimensions, amounts, and particular performance of the Sky, I can't say where I would have operated the levels.

 

Andy, yes, the low oil level was a known causative factor almost immediately, and was the reason for the AIB and Viking's recommendations to rethink oil levels.  As for who is responsible for verifying oil levels, that would be the Chief Engineer, through his Standing Orders, and the company's ISM code.  There is a vast difference between your car's oil sump and a marine engine's sump.  Most cars don't have an oil level sensor, it relies on oil pressure, and that will only go off when the pump actually starts sucking air instead of oil (which is what happened on the Sky), but if you had a sensor that told you you were two quarts low, that would better equate to the Sky.  When a low oil level alarm goes off on a marine engine, in 98% of the cases, that engine will continue to operate for days or weeks, if left unattended.

 

As for oil level monitoring, the sumps on these medium speed engines will have low and high level alarms, which do not show an exact volume, you have to know this from the builder's calculations, and via a dipstick, just like your car.  Oil levels should be checked by engine room personnel every watch (4 hours), but again, the dipstick will only tell you where you are in the range from low to high, and it is by experience that you know that say 1" on the dipstick is 200 liters.  Typically, oil levels are noted in the engine room logbooks simply as "okay" or "low".

 

Marine diesel engines have "purifiers" or "centrifugal filters" in addition to normal particulate filters, and these purifiers are designed to remove not only particulates, but water from the oil.  However, to do this, the purifier has a small amount of water in it, acting as a seal, and when adding "virgin" lube oil (brand new oil from the storage tank) to a running engine with a purifier active, it can actually ADD water to the oil, until the oil molecules have been "stressed" by being run through the engine a few times.  So, there are some reasons for only adding oil at certain intervals, and not at others.

 

While nothing above exonerates Viking in this incident, nothing in the interim report "damns" them either, and until a final report comes out with references to the company's ISM procedures at the time, it is unknown how badly Viking practices were promulgated or followed.

[OnTheJourney]

6 hours ago, chengkp75 said:

 

 

Quote

 

While nothing above exonerates Viking in this incident, nothing in the interim report "damns" them either

 

Chengkp...thanks as always for sharing your technical knowledge of these matters. In consideration of the statement from your post that I quoted, I have to wonder why Viking is agreeing to a settlement before the final report is issued - especially if critical informational components have not yet been fully ascertained. It would appear that the "drilling down" required to determine exactly who did - or did not do - whatever relative to monitoring the oil situation and so forth is not an overriding factor for Viking's law representatives in determining when it's time to arrive at a settlement, and that enough has apparently been revealed. As I think Dave already mentioned - probably best to end it now before any additional facts arise that would be more damaging. Still, as with many things, answers just seem to lead to more questions - ones that probably should be answered before the case would be settled. As a passenger, I think Viking has already gone above and beyond to do what they could in the way of compensation. Certainly those who wound up in the hospital - let alone have possibly permanent injuries from the incident - may feel differently. This is not to imply that I'm in search of mitigating factors - quite the contrary - but I just hate to see how so many situations morph into a legal 'money grab' in our very litigious society. 

Edited December 9, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[chengkp75]

I believe that Viking feels that it is almost always cheaper to settle than to run the risk of a trial, whether they are to blame or not.  Most of the cruise lines follow this path.

[OnTheJourney]

Makes sense. On the tails of this discussion, what is a bit alarming are the other incidents that have taken place with Viking in a relatively short span of time, the worst being, of course, the fatal riverboat collision. No specific insinuation intended, but it does raise even more interesting questions. 

Edited December 9, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[Heidi13]

13 hours ago, GeezerCouple said:

 

What is a [reasonable] reason for allowing the oil to get so low?

 

Assuming one would need to top it off more frequently, wouldn't approximately the same amount of oil be used regardless of the frequency?

Is there significant down time associated with refilling?  Crew time?

 

GC

Not being an Engineer and not knowing the E/R systems, my best guess is that they can transfer from Lub Oil Storage tanks to the individual DG tanks remotely from the control room. Being new ships, most likely all completed on the various monitors in the ER Control Room.

 

Why they were so low should be answered in the final report. Insufficient facts have been promulgated to make an informed decision, at present.

[Heidi13]

3 hours ago, OnTheJourney said:

 

 

Chengkp...thanks as always for sharing your technical knowledge of these matters. In consideration of the statement from your post that I quoted, I have to wonder why Viking is agreeing to a settlement before the final report is issued - especially if critical informational components have not yet been fully ascertained. It would appear that the "drilling down" required to determine exactly who did - or did not do - whatever relative to monitoring the oil situation and so forth is not an overriding factor for Viking's law representatives in determining when it's time to arrive at a settlement, and that enough has apparently been revealed. As I think Dave already mentioned - probably best to end it now before any additional facts arise that would be more damaging. Still, as with many things, answers just seem to lead to more questions - ones that probably should be answered before the case would be settled. As a passenger, I think Viking has already gone above and beyond to do what they could in the way of compensation. Certainly those who wound up in the hospital - let alone have possibly permanent injuries from the incident - may feel differently. This is not to imply that I'm in search of mitigating factors - quite the contrary - but I just hate to see how so many situations morph into a legal 'money grab' in our very litigious society. 

The other consideration, with respect to the litigation is that in addition to Viking and their insurers, you also have the Ship Manager, who I assume would also have been included as a named party in the claim. 

[Heidi13]

10 hours ago, chengkp75 said:

I'll do some catching up on this thread.

 

First, as for the inoperable #3 DG.  This engine had a failure, and the failure was being repaired at the time of the incident.  The ship still had 75% of full power available, which is sufficient to safely navigate the ship.  As for those questioning whether a ship is "safe" to sail without one engine, the answer is yes, as long as it has one engine, any ship is "seaworthy", and passenger vessels now must have two available at all times to meet the Safe Return to Port regulations.  Diesel engines are torn down completely and overhauled every 12,000 running hours (about every 2 years), and this overhaul takes about 2-3 weeks, so the nearly every cruise ship spends a significant amount of each year cruising along with one engine in pieces in the engine room, and the passengers are blithely unaware.  Cruise itineraries are designed to only require full power rarely, and when overhauls are scheduled, they are set even more strictly for speed needed between ports.  Why was the engine down for a week, possibly before the MAN rep arrived to make the repair?  Perhaps the ship needed to get a new turbo, or parts, and there was no need to have the tech rep onboard if the parts necessary for the repair were not there.

 

Now to lube oil levels.  What the report doesn't say is whether or not the lowered oil levels were "the norm" for the ship, or whether it was an anomaly.  Even Viking's decision to review lube oil management procedures does not necessarily mean that this was a fleetwide norm, or even the norm for this ship, but only that the company feels that tighter control needs to be implemented.  While operating with a lower oil level is not "industry best practices", the engines were operating without a low oil level alarm, and that alarm is set by the manufacturer, with a healthy safety margin.  The alarms going off and clearing after a few seconds is not unusual in heavy weather, as the level sensor is only at one side/end of the sump tank, and that tank may be 2 meters wide and 6 meters long, so there will be significant sloshing.  And, as I stated on the earlier thread, overfilling a sump tank can lead to oil mist in the crankcase, and an engine shutdown from sloshing in heavy weather (I had one last week, and the sump tank wasn't overfilled, just a whole lot of rolling and pitching caused the oil mist).  The 10m3 of oil used to fill the engines surely did come from a storage tank, and that was certainly not exhausted when this was done.  That amount, among 3 engines, is about right to bring the oil level from the reported levels to the high recommended level.  Marine engines have very large oil capacities, to allow for things like sloshing in heavy weather, and you typically don't add oil until you are down a significant amount (500-1000 liters), as the measuring means is crude at best.  The lowered oil level, while significant, is not a "damning" fact.  It merely means that the company needs to revisit their policies on this.  While I would personally and professionally would not have operated engines at this oil level, at least for an extended period, and as I've said, it isn't best practices, it is fairly common.  I can see reasons for a lowered oil level, but again without knowing the exact dimensions, amounts, and particular performance of the Sky, I can't say where I would have operated the levels.

 

Andy, yes, the low oil level was a known causative factor almost immediately, and was the reason for the AIB and Viking's recommendations to rethink oil levels.  As for who is responsible for verifying oil levels, that would be the Chief Engineer, through his Standing Orders, and the company's ISM code.  There is a vast difference between your car's oil sump and a marine engine's sump.  Most cars don't have an oil level sensor, it relies on oil pressure, and that will only go off when the pump actually starts sucking air instead of oil (which is what happened on the Sky), but if you had a sensor that told you you were two quarts low, that would better equate to the Sky.  When a low oil level alarm goes off on a marine engine, in 98% of the cases, that engine will continue to operate for days or weeks, if left unattended.

 

As for oil level monitoring, the sumps on these medium speed engines will have low and high level alarms, which do not show an exact volume, you have to know this from the builder's calculations, and via a dipstick, just like your car.  Oil levels should be checked by engine room personnel every watch (4 hours), but again, the dipstick will only tell you where you are in the range from low to high, and it is by experience that you know that say 1" on the dipstick is 200 liters.  Typically, oil levels are noted in the engine room logbooks simply as "okay" or "low".

 

Marine diesel engines have "purifiers" or "centrifugal filters" in addition to normal particulate filters, and these purifiers are designed to remove not only particulates, but water from the oil.  However, to do this, the purifier has a small amount of water in it, acting as a seal, and when adding "virgin" lube oil (brand new oil from the storage tank) to a running engine with a purifier active, it can actually ADD water to the oil, until the oil molecules have been "stressed" by being run through the engine a few times.  So, there are some reasons for only adding oil at certain intervals, and not at others.

 

While nothing above exonerates Viking in this incident, nothing in the interim report "damns" them either, and until a final report comes out with references to the company's ISM procedures at the time, it is unknown how badly Viking practices were promulgated or followed.

Chief - Thanks for the assistance. Appreciate you circling back to answer some of the questions. At times it was taxing my knowledge of engineering procedures, especially as I haven't worked cruise ships for a few years.

[DaveSJ711]

Chengkp75 and I have something in common:  He's a Mainer, and my father's ancestors were all Mainers (dating back hundreds of years in fact).  But we disagree on the interim report's significance -- specifically, whether the facts and findings laid out in the report are damning for Viking.

 

Recall the report's second finding:  "The diesel generators shut down as a result of the loss of lubricating oil tank suction due to low oil sump tank levels, combined with pitching and rolling."  And the report's third finding:  "All three operational diesel generators shut down within 19 minutes of each other, causing blackout and loss of propulsion."  In other words, the report drew a straight line from low oil, to engine shutdown, to blackout and loss of propulsion.  That's a causal link that I, as a trial lawyer, would love to take to a jury -- together with the huge delta that existed between the Sky's actual oil levels and MAN's recommendation.

 

Then we have the Accident Investigation Board's recommendation that vessel owners (1) maintain oil levels in accordance with manufacturer instructions, and (2) "top up" oil levels if poor weather is forecast.  That recommendation followed the Maritime Authority's Safety Message regarding the supply of oil to critical systems under expected operating conditions.  The Board's recommendation and the Authority's message sound like best practices for the situation that the Sky encountered on March 23-24 -- and in fact knew it would encounter due to the weather forecast at the time.  If that recommendation and message don't represent best practices, then why did the Board and the Authority make them?  (Chengkp75 acknowledges that operating a cruise vessel with a low oil level isn't best practices.)

 

Chengkp75 notes that the interim report doesn't say whether the low oil levels were the norm for the Sky, or whether they were an anomaly for the vessel.  I agree that the report doesn't provide this information.  Ultimately, however, the legal question is what a typical vessel, operating with the same set of facts, should have done under similar circumstances -- with the weather forecast being key.   

 

Chengkp75 suggests that Viking settled to avoid litigation expense and the risk of trial.  That's probably true as far as it goes.  (I know something about the settlement process, having settled more than 200 cases in my legal career.)  What's important in this case, however, is the timing of the settlement -- just one week after the interim report was released.  The report gave enormous leverage to the plaintiffs' attorneys.  At the same time, Viking's attorneys no doubt informed their client that the report altered the risk-benefit calculus to a significant degree.  As I said before, the resulting settlement was not a coincidence.

 

One more point.  The settlement will resolve the claims of the Sky passengers.  But it will not resolve insurance claims for damage to the vessel and loss of use.  That type of litigation can get fiendishly complex.  It will be interesting to see if Viking's insurance carriers deny coverage.  We will see.             

 

 

Edited December 9, 2019 by DaveSJ711

[chengkp75]

I am not a lawyer, and certainly not an admiralty lawyer.  However, the AIB recommendation to more closely watch and maintain oil levels did not come out until after this event, which means that previously it was not felt to be a significant occurrence, i.e. not having happened before.  Yes, the low oil level was a direct causative agent in the incident, but even if it was not best industry practice, it was a common practice and not considered to be a significant issue, or there would have been warnings years before.

 

As to insurance, this comes under two different covers, hull and P&I.  Hull insurance will likely not have much to play in this, since there was little significant damage to the vessel.  P&I insurance is a mutual insurance, so any claims made by Viking for loss of use would only result in their premiums going up over the next years, or being asked to leave the P&I club with the resultant higher premiums required for a lower tier P&I club.

 

I will add that if the company's ISM code did not specifically address this situation, i.e. the proper oil level to maintain in the engines, and particularly when entering heavy weather, and if the class society did not require this to be in the ISM code through numerous corporate and shipboard ISM audits, then there is not a lot of "negligence" to be found.  And, since each company's ISM manual is different, within the confines of the ISM code, and they are restricted documents, only the AIB and the lawyers can know this for sure at this time.

Edited December 9, 2019 by chengkp75

[Heidi13]

I'm also not a Lawyer, however as a Mariner with 30 yrs Command experience, I have completed Ship Master's Business, which covers the multiple levels of Marine Law, Acts, Regulations & Conventions. As a highly specialised area, any Lawyers accepting marine cases normally hire Admiralty Lawyers or Attorneys of the Sea, to assist them.

 

As a Mariner, I agree with the Chief that the Interim report provides minimal additional facts than what was already available and I certainly don't consider that the Interim Report provides new significant facts that could categorically determine fault on behalf of Viking. Viking and/or the Ship Manager may eventually be found to be at fault, but nothing in the Interim Report provides the facts to convince this Mariner, at this time.

 

The Interim Report repeated the fact the oil levels were low. How and why the levels were low is key information in determining fault. What written and electronic documents were available on board and what recommended levels did they provide. The Interim Report stated the OEM recommended levels, but did not state these recommended levels were on-board and readily available to the crew. The investigation will also look at the operation since the ship became operational - did they have oil mist issues with higher levels and have received an OEM variance for lower levels?

 

This is only a couple of literally many, many options that must be investigated. Only when we have the answers to these and many others can we begin to make informed decisions on potentially who was at fault. Once the Final Report is issued, I will read thoroughly and based on the full picture will determine my personal thoughts on fault. However, while I may discuss the findings & facts, my personal determination of potential fault will remain private and will not be discussed on an open forum.

 

I further note that the Interim & Final Reports are reports of the investigation to determine the facts and make recommendations to prevent similar incidents. This organisation does not determine fault. The regulatory infractions/fault are determined by separate investigations by the Country's Coast Guard, or equivalent.

[chengkp75]

1 hour ago, Heidi13 said:

I further note that the Interim & Final Reports are reports of the investigation to determine the facts and make recommendations to prevent similar incidents. This organisation does not determine fault. The regulatory infractions/fault are determined by separate investigations by the Country's Coast Guard, or equivalent.

I agree with Andy here, and I know that ship Masters have fringe contact with maritime law all the time, so you gain knowledge by experience.  I would add that in the ISM operational culture that ships operate under, finding "blame" or "fault" is not the objective, it is rather to find out what went wrong, and what is needed to prevent it in the future.  This is the mission of agencies like Norway's AIB and the USCG's Cruise Ship Centers of Expertise, as well as the class societies and the IMO.

[OnTheJourney]

Wow! 86 posts following JD's reference and link to the interim report. Sure got things 'stirred' up a bit. Funny that at no time, in any of the threads dealing with this, has there been mention of any other incidents. Copied from a June article that referred to the collision with the lock at Riedenburg.....

 

The incident was the fifth involving one of Viking's ships since last fall and the fourth involving a European river vessel.

In late March, engine failures on the Viking Sky ocean liner forced a lengthy and dramatic helicopter evacuation in rough seas off the coast of Norway.

A little more than a week later, the Viking Idun river ship collided with a cargo vessel while sailing through Belgium on April 1.

Last month, the Viking Sigyn hit a small tour boat during a stormy nighttime cruise along a crowded stretch of the Danube in Budapest, killing 19 South Korean tourists and a Hungarian crewman. Seven people were rescued, eight are still missing, and the Viking captain was placed under arrest.

Last fall, the Viking Tor failed to retract its wheelhouse far enough and hit the bridge at the Riedenburg lock, destroying the wheelhouse.

No Viking river cruise passengers have been injured in the accidents, but two Viking crew members were killed in September 2016 in a wheelhouse accident similar to last year's incident with the Viking Tor, according to the German media outlet Cruisetricks.de.

 

Not that any of these other accidents have a direct bearing on the focus of the discussion here, but it almost suggests that perhaps a thorough review of many different sailing procedures and policies - beyond that of just the maintenance of oil levels - would be in order, if not already done. 

Edited December 10, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[Heidi13]

2 hours ago, chengkp75 said:

I agree with Andy here, and I know that ship Masters have fringe contact with maritime law all the time, so you gain knowledge by experience.  I would add that in the ISM operational culture that ships operate under, finding "blame" or "fault" is not the objective, it is rather to find out what went wrong, and what is needed to prevent it in the future.  This is the mission of agencies like Norway's AIB and the USCG's Cruise Ship Centers of Expertise, as well as the class societies and the IMO.

To expand on the Chief's reference to the ISM Code. In addition to transforming the industry away from a "Blame" culture it also clearly outlines the Master's Authority. This is such an important topic that the ISM Code dedicates an entire chapter.

 

MASTER'S RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY

5.1 The Company should clearly define and document the master's responsibility with regard to:

• implementing the safety and environmental-protection policy of the Company;
• motivating the crew in the observation of that policy;
• issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple manner;
• verifying that specified requirements are observed; and
• periodically reviewing the SMS and reporting its deficiencies to the shore-based management.

5.2 The Company should ensure that the SMS operating on board the ship contains a clear statement emphasizing the master's authority. The Company should establish in the SMS that the master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention and to request the Company's assistance as may be necessary.

 

As copied above, the Master has "Over-riding authority and responsibility" in making any decision with respect to safety and pollution prevention.  When dealing with safety & pollution prevention the Master may take any decision, in their professional judgement, with respect to safety or pollution prevention. Since the marine environment has infinite variables, as I highly doubt this exact situation has been duplicated on similar vessels in similar weather and topographical circumstances. We also have to remember that unlike the airline industry, which has thousands on B-737 and A-319/320, the marine industry has very few identical ships.

 

My last command was 1 of only 2 ships of the class, which were built in the same yards, however they had slightly different thrusters and handled completely differently. Therefore, in the marine industry a "Typical" vessel is a rare commodity. A lawyer could argue that the ships were sister ships, but I could supply a significant number of subject matter experts - Captains & Chief Engineers that would completely discount that incorrect assumption.

 

This "Over-riding" authority and responsibility is another factor that requires extensive investigation as based on risk assessments the Master, in consultation with the Chief Engineer can legally make decisions that are contrary to the company SMS.

[chengkp75]

7 hours ago, OnTheJourney said:

Not that any of these other accidents have a direct bearing on the focus of the discussion here, but it almost suggests that perhaps a thorough review of many different sailing procedures and policies - beyond that of just the maintenance of oil levels - would be in order, if not already done.

Under the ISM, each and every one of the incidents you link to would have initiated an internal and external audit of the company's ISM plan.  Also, I'm not sure of the corporate structure of Viking in regards to how integrated the river operations are to the ocean operations, so they may fall under two separate ISM plans, but in any case, inland vessels fall under different classifications to ocean going vessels.

[OnTheJourney]

Heidi or Cheng.....any idea if there is consistency among cruise lines as to the Master having to consult with the 'home office' (for lack of a more accurate term) in arriving at decisions? It has been implied here many times during the course of the thread that the Master has 'overriding authority' with respect to making most (or all?) decisions. I'm just wondering since, having been on another cruise lately that encountered weather disturbances and wound up making course and itinerary changes, the Master on that vessel alluded to having had several consultations with the home office in Miami before the decisions were made. He indicated that for the most part a captain's evaluation of the situation rules the day, but that there is no guarantee of this. I would not imagine that the final report will allude to anything of this nature, i.e. communication between ship and whomever else might be involved that resulted in the decision to continue the itinerary - but just got me wondering about it. Are there instances that you're aware of where a Master's decision was overruled relative to instigating change to course or schedule? Does this sort of thing happen? I'm only going by what the passengers were told on a recent sailing. 

Edited December 10, 2019 by OnTheJourney

[Heidi13]

Can't comment on how each cruise line operates, but note that the ISM Code is very clear in outlining the Master's Authority. As noted in Section 5 of the ISM Code that I posted yesterday, the SMS must include a clear statement respecting the Master's Authority.

 

Basically the Master, in consultation with the Head of Departments on board has the authority to make decisions in accordance with the Company SMS. In addition, with respect to safety (which can have a wide scope) and pollution prevention, the Master's Over-riding authority and responsibility dictates he/she may legally make any decision that in their professional experience/judgement is required for the safety of the vessel/crew/passengers and prevention of pollution. In these 2 areas he/she can make decisions contravening the company SMS.

 

When discussing with the office, the Master will advise what is not happening and may discuss options with shore management. However, as always, the Master has the final say. For example, say the Master is not comfortable docking in a port or following a voyage plan, he/she may discuss options with the office. Say they come up with 3 options. The Master would review each option for safety and ability of the vessel to achieve. If the Master had safety concerns with an option, he/she would veto it. Therefore, the office may select an option, but only from those acceptable to the Master.

 

Back in my sea-going days, if I had weather or mechanical issues, my call to the office was not requesting permission to secure the vessel. I was notifying them the ship was coming out of service, so then we discussed options to mitigate impacts to the customer and if mechanical, how to effect speedy repairs.

 

Doesn't exactly answer your question, but hope it help clarifies the process. I note, some younger Masters may describe the process differently.

[chengkp75]

I agree wholeheartedly with Andy's description.  While the details of how and when consultations with the home office need to be done can vary depending on each company's ISM code, as stated, the Captain has the authority to make the final decision.  Now, that does not absolve the Captain from investigation or punishment if things go wrong, but he/she cannot be simply punished for making a decision contrary to what the home office or another authority would prefer.  When an incident happens, then the ISM requires that the company's incident manager (ashore) be "in charge", or until a national agency takes command, but even so, the Master has the final word, as he/she is the person on the spot.

 

As Andy says, if the Master has two options, both acceptable to the Master and to the ISM, let's say proceeding on schedule, or staying in port, and the Master wants to proceed, the company can overrule the Master and keep the ship in port.  It is, after all, the company's ship, not the Master's, and the Master is the Company's "agent", so he will do what the company wants, unless he feels it adversely affects the safety of ship, cargo (passengers), crew, or environment.

[OnTheJourney]

Thanks for further clarification!  

[OnTheJourney]

Hey fellow March Sky guests...check out my recent thread regarding the (totally unbeknownst to me) application of my voucher towards a trip that wouldn't even use much more than a third of the available money. Can't believe an agent whom I've never spoken to would arbitrarily do this. Hoping I can get it straightened out. The concern is that the final payment for the trip they applied the vouchers to is due by end of this month. Right now, according to the guy that called me, I'm showing a zero balance. Something or someone goofed.....

[OnTheJourney]

All is resolved....but surely most interesting how this rather bizarre situation came about. Be interesting to hear if any other Sky passengers wind up having their vouchers applied to a trip other than as intended. My agent said he has no idea why it happened but is looking into it. 

[JDincalif]

On 12/6/2019 at 8:03 AM, DaveSJ711 said:

The settlement agreement won't be limited to the named plaintiffs (the Freudmanns).  The Notice calls for the plaintiffs to file a motion to certify a class.  Like the settlement itself, the motion is due on or before December 20.  How broad or how narrow the class will be isn't specified.  (I assume the class will include all Sky passengers.)  Once the judge certifies the class and approves the settlement, Sky passengers will receive some sort of notice as to their rights under the settlement.

 

DaveSJ711: Have you seen any additional information about this matter? Appreciate all that you've provided to date.