chengkp75

Fuel quality issues are a large, and growing problem in the industry, but over the last 20 years or so, we've come up with ways to minimize the risk, but nothing in life is without risk.

The ISM model of safety management uses a "likelihood/consequence" matrix to make decisions on actions that are not automatically approved by the SMS. This is a matrix with "likelihood" on the vertical (how likely is the result of the action to happen), and "consequences" on the horizontal (what happens if the worst happens). So, for each action (say, running aground on the Na Pali coast), you assign a likelihood (rare to almost certain) and then a consequence (from insignificant to extreme) that may happen (if you do run aground). Crossing the likelihood with the consequence gives a risk assessment for the action, from low to extreme. Your actions should never be in the high or extreme risk areas, moderate is allowed with permissions and mediating methods, and low is best. You then think of the mediating actions that can moderate the risk (having bow thrusters running, going slowly, etc), and assign an effectiveness rating to these mediating actions, to determine how much risk there is after you've done all the mediation actions you think can help. So, long story long, yes it is a sliding scale of risk, and the risk assessment matrix allows you to find where the risk isn't acceptable anymore. Edge could have gone closer (baring any legal restriction) should the risk matrix allowed it (which would depend on things like weather, water depth, obstacles, etc) Actually, while the cruise ships may be maseratis, Navy vessels are the Corollas, and 95% of merchant ships are the "dump trucks". Most Navy vessels have multiple propellers and multiple rudders, while most merchant ships have one diesel engine bolted to a propeller shaft driving one propeller, and having one rudder. While Navy vessels most often use tugs, merchant ships (other than cruise ships) will always use them, as they are so unmaneuverable. When a merchant ship Captain transitions to cruise ships, it takes a few hours to become comfortable with the systems, and amount of maneuverability. In the "old days" he learned by doing it (docking the cruise ship under the Captain's supervision), but now simulators are so good that some ships even have one onboard for training/refreshing/casualty training. Again, not trying to marginalize the ex-Navy Captain's experience, but it is similar to someone who has a private pilot's license and learned on a single engine Cessna, comparing their comfort level to sitting in the flight deck of a 777.

Looking at some of the RCI "who's the Captain" threads, it seems he was Captain of Allure in 2020.

That depends on what you call a "fuel system problem". Each separate engine room has a separate low pressure fuel system, and each engine has a separate high pressure fuel system. So, mechanical failure in the "fuel system" does not mean that all engines will fail. You would have to have multiple mechanical failures. One problem I've heard questions about is fuel quality. Ships still use residual bunker fuel for the propulsion engine, but many use diesel fuel for the generators. But, even those that use residual in the generator engines, just about all will draw fuel for their various fuel systems from one tank, the "day tank" (so named because it will hold about 36 hours of fuel for all uses (propulsion and generation), and is filled daily from the storage tanks. Fuel from various locations around the world are not always "compatible" (meaning when you mix them together, bad things happen), and incompatible fuels can form long chain hydrocarbons that will clog fuel filters, stopping fuel flow to the engines. For this reason, fuel is typically loaded to empty storage tanks only (so no mixing there), and is sampled and the sample sent to a lab for analysis. Industry standard is to not use the newly bunkered fuel until the lab results come back, and the ship makes the determination of whether the new fuel and the old fuel are compatible. Residual fuel, and all fuel that has come via pipelines is dirty (rust flakes, sand, etc) so when fuel is needed from the storage tanks, it is transferred to the "settling tank", so named because it gives the contaminants time to settle out before going to the "day tank". When transferred from the settling tank to the day tank, it is filtered by sending it through a centrifuge (solids get flung to the outside and are discharged, fuel stays on the inside and is pumped to the day tank. Some fuels are "unstable", meaning that the "heavy phase" (bunker oil), and the "light phase" (the diesel fuel used to "cut" the bunker to the proper viscosity) are not really compatible, but only react when subjected to the high speeds/forces in the centrifuges. This can cause long wax strings to form in the fuel, also clogging fuel filters. So, incompatible fuels, and unstable fuels are a known problem in the maritime world (refineries will send you anything they can, just to get rid of it), so the use of sampling and testing, and fuel segregation measures will mediate the problem, but there is always the possibility of having it happen. I had it happen on a few ships. And, if this was the case on the Dali, it is very likely that the fuel taken on in Baltimore was not the cause, but the fuel taken on the previous time, which was just starting to be used while at the dock in Baltimore. Again, it is the swiss cheese model of accident causation. There are several slices of cheese (fuel testing, fuel segregation, fuel additives), that are mediation techniques, and each of them likely has a "hole" in the slice causing that method to fail (like mixing fuel in a tank), but if that hole lines up with solid cheese on the "fuel testing" slice, then there is no problem. It is only when all the "holes" (potential failure modes) line up together, that the failure has a way to get to the end, the casualty. Sorry for the long winded explanation.

Well, first off, all I've heard is speculation about the power failures. We don't know what caused them, we don't know whether they were repaired. We don't know if the power failure that caused the ship to allide with the bridge was the same problem as the problems at the dock. If it is found that the Chief Engineer withheld information from the Captain, then yes, he could be found to have violated the SMS policies, as well as possibly being held legally liable as well. Quite a few ships sail into/out of port every day, all around the world, with "propulsion problems" as they are referred to here on CC. Ships are required to have 100% redundancy of power, on line and running, while maneuvering into/out of port. This means that two generators, each of which can handle the entire shipboard electrical load, will be running, and connected to the switchboard, so that if one of them fails, the other can carry the full load. But, what happens if the second online generator fails as well? That's why ships all have at least 3 generators, so that there is a backup. But, engines need maintenance and repair. So, one generator is taken out of service for maintenance, and the ship is now going to enter port. Is this a "propulsion problem"? Not legally, since there are the statutory required two generators available and running. But, they don't have a backup. While some may say this is a "propulsion problem" because not all the generators are available for use, it is not considered to be of sufficient probability that the third generator would be needed, that it would be required to be available. Some systems onboard have two pumps, one running, one standby. If the standby pump is being overhauled, that could be a "propulsion problem" if it stopped running, and the other pump isn't available, but the simple fact that a standby pump is out of service is not a "propulsion problem", since the system is working.

Again, just as I've said on the other threads, if he violated or ignored established company SMS policies or procedures, then he can be held responsible. Whether there are proceedings against his license will depend on India (the nation that issued his license). Whether he will be prosecuted in the US, either criminally or civilly, depends somewhat on what is decided in the USCG/NTSB investigation as to whether he was in compliance with all US laws and company SMS or not, but there will likely be a trial over the deaths of the workers. From an ISM viewpoint, there is no difference between this incident and the one concerning the Celebrity Edge in Hawaii, as far as assigning blame or punishing the Captain. If however, either the Captain's actions, or the SMS is in violation of US law, then there could be punishment for either or both the Captain and the company. I know you feel that Captains should be relieved of command immediately after any incident, but the US is still a country where you are innocent until proven guilty.

Without minimalizing your DH's service to our country in any way shape or fashion, I believe even he would admit that Navy vessels in no way compare with cruise ships for maneuverability. While Navy vessels have extremely high power capabilities, many even more power than Edge, that is for speed in the open ocean, and they are very limited when maneuvering at low speed in confined waters. This is where equipment like bow and stern thrusters, azipods, and high lift rudders (on various types of cruise ships) come into play, and are what negates the use of tug boats when docking, unlike the Navy cousins. So, while your DH felt uncomfortable where the ship was, based on his experience with ships that don't compare to cruise ships, I think that after a few hours using a bridge simulator of the Edge, he would change his mind. I did a short stint with the "Gray Funnel Line" when I was young, but as an engineer, I was a "doer", not a "pointer", and felt the Navy was just not a good fit for me. Went on for a 46 year career as a Marine Engineer, 38 of them as Chief. Was the ship too close, by law? Yes. Was it too close for safety? Only those on the bridge that day can say for sure. They had all the data, they had the experience in handling that ship in that kind of weather. Go Navy.

What they are trying to say is that the second image gives the size of the rock outcropping that shows at the bottom of the first image, which means that according to the ship tracking image, the ship is about 1200-1500 feet from the rock. Now, to put a little finer context, the point showing the ship's location is the location of the AIS transmitter, which is typically above the bridge. Edge is 1000 feet long, so when the ship is pointing away from the coast, the stern would be likely 600-800 feet closer to shore than the position "dot". Further, as I noted before, maritime GPS has an accuracy of about 45 feet at best, so that could put the ship that much closer, or that much farther away from shore. So, while it appears to be very close to shore, that is irrelevant depending on the ocean bottom at that location, but it does place the ship definitely within the restricted zone.

Nope, sorry. All I see is the ship's wake after having turned around, just as I described it before. Don't believe I heard the locals saying anything about "reefs", just coral, which can carpet the sea bottom, or even make small ridges on the bottom, but these are not "reefs" that are large, hard, ancient ridges that come closer to the surface. Where did this come from? I would think that those folks who were on the ship would have heard the anchors going out, and not likely anything there to get the anchor stuck on. Well, if you think about it, its both. From what I remember, the statute is written to restrict boats with 50 or more passengers, because the more passengers, the bigger the vessel.

Looked at that video as well, don't see any reefs there.

And, if you weren't aware that the law existed, i.e. before you heard about it on this thread, would you have made the "easy" google search in the first place?

Frankly, I went back and looked at the photos, and don't see any evidence of coral reefs anywhere near the ship. I see sand stirred up by the propellers, and I see lighter blue water mixed with that brown, sandy water, where the change in color is caused by the aeration of the water by the propellers. While I don't know the underwater geography of the Na Pali coast, in particular where this incident happened, again, I don't see any evidence of reefing. Now, the seabed is likely covered in coral, and stirring up the sand probably didn't do that any good, but to say that there are "reefs" in the area, of a sufficient age to be strong enough to harm a ship (as opposed to a ship breaking off a high growing fan coral) is pure speculation.

No, but there are some cruises that just do Australian ports, that are homeported there, and these ships have to apply for licenses to operate there, and they have to hire a percentage of crew from Australia.

What is being stated is basically what the SMS requires of bridge team management and passage planning. While the 24 hours may apply to cruise ships, where they are in port every day, it is not common on long passages, where the route is set at the beginning of the passage, and unless there are required deviations from that original plan, the plan isn't "signed off" except at the beginning. I will also disagree that the route planning is sent to corporate after signing off, when in fact it is done generally again at the beginning of the passage, after the Master has approved it, but before it is discussed with the bridge team. That way, corporate gets a vote on it, before it becomes "law" by being signed by the bridge team. That, at least, has been my experience in 30 years of operating under the ISM (note that the Chief Engineer has to be notified of the passage plan, and sign his/her acknowledgement as well as the bridge team).

Australia does, but the both the Navigation Act of 1912 and the Coastal Trading Act of 2012 allow for the granting of licenses to foreign flag ships to operate in Australian waters. I believe in 2016, the government moved to simplify the regulations regarding these licenses (used to be for 12 months, and specified number of voyages, and each voyage had to be approved in advance), but I don't know if the CTA was repealed or not. Brazil will do this also, but again for limited time periods subject to renewal.