CostaSmurfette

The captain of the Vincennes reacted to what he perceived was a threat to his ship and crew and his reaction to carry out his duty to protect took precedence.

 

You can not compare this to an unnecessary showboating, skirt-chasing stunt gone terribly wrong. The fact that there were 3 people on the bridge that had absolutely no business being there makes it eversomuch reckless and shows total disregard for the ship, passengers and crew members.

Negative.

He may have perceived a threat, BUT, he went into Iranian territorial waters without need or permission. He also went off to chase boghammers despite his commanding officer telling him not to. The fact that the Montgomery was having issues with said boghammers and was dealing with them and thus did not require assistance from Vincennes and did not request assistance from Vincennes, shows that Vincennes went there to get in the mix on their own volition and in direct contradiction to orders.

Therefore, Vincennes WAS in the wrong place, they WERE mixing for a fight that they had no place being in, they DID sail into Iranian waters and they shot down an airliner cos the USN kept making radio calls that went unanswered on the MILITARY emergency frequency and the CIVILIAN emergency frequency that the airliner was unable to hear even if they wanted to. Not only that, the radio operator on Vincennes did not specify which plane they were calling, so IR655 would not have realised it was they who Vincennes was screaming at.

It does not mean, however that the actions of Concordia's captain and Vincennes captain are any different...they BOTH played fast and loose with people's lives, they BOTH made extreme errors of judgement and they BOTH deserve punishment that suit those mistakes.

And let us not forget here, the reply to IR655 and the lack of perceived remorse or sorrow for the loss of innocent lives, another aircraft was broght down a few months later...PA103. The Vincennes crew were highly trained but that did not stop them screwing up....just as Concordia's crew were highly trained and they also screwed up...and in both cases it cost lives and that is NOTHING to be proud of.

Sounds like a fishing expedition but to answer your question;

The captain is the 'captain of the ship'. If he,or any of his crew for any reason what so ever feels it is unsafe, he can get off the boat and go home. (oops, that's just what he did after He made the boat unsafe) It would be really dumb to pull a daring night time sail by if he thought the ship was not safe. But then again, Schettino is obviously not the sharpest knife in the drawer, probably more like a spoon.

You didn't answer the question (no surprise there since you constantly make veiled personal attacks towards anyone who does not agree with your point of view)....

Is there a "minimum equipment list" or MEL that a ship must have in regard to fully functioning equipment that MUST be in full working order BEFORE a ship sails?

We already know that the sonar system was off, there are also other items that were deemed faulty or turned off...to the extent that engineers were due to meet the ship in Savona on January 14 to get these items fixed.

Now....my question is that if these things were known about, would/should that have been grounds for the authorities in Barcelona or Civitavecchia to delay or refuse the sailing until those items were fixed...or is it the normal procedure to allow ships to sail regardless as to whether or not they have their full compliment of safety, navigation and other major equipment in full working order or turned off?

If the authorities in Barcelona and Civitavecchia KNEW there were technical issues with Concordia and they ALLOWED her to sail regardless, then surely that is a very poor standard of authority on the part of those two ports.

With the list of technical equipment defects growing, the ship most definitely had a part in what happened, along with the human element - both on the bridge AND those in head office who also would have known the ship was sub-par and who allowed it to sail....ie placing revenue over pax/crew safety in the event of that defective equipment being required, such as the depth sonar, which if it had been working that night, the bridge crew MIGHT have been better informed as to how much water was under their keel.

Going back to the ship and her apparently growing list of unserviceable equipment...

Perhaps Tonka can answer this in a mature way since he has some experience of being at sea other than as a passenger...

Is there some sort of "minimum equipment list" that a ship must have in order to proceed to sea safely?

In aviation, the MEL is a vital piece in regard to safety...that is to say, that is an aircraft is missing vitial instrumentation or equipment is unserviceable that that equpiment could potentially endanger the aircraft and anyone on it, the aircraft is grounded until everything is in full working order and signed off as nil defect.

Concordia seems to have been having quite a few equipment problems...whether switched off or just unserviceable....so if such a minimum equipment list exists for shipping, would the "missing" items not be on that list as reasons to keep the ship in port until all were put right?

Or is it a case of "well they were due to be fixed, appointment booked with engineers" but the accident happened before that date...which seems to have been the case here....and Concordia was given clearance to sail on the proviso that all faults would be repaired by a given date (in this case January 14, 2012)...?

I am curious as to whether or not there is a go/no-go type of legislation in shipping and if not, after this accident, that maybe the introduction of this measure would be viable?

It gets even better...for some reason, the sonar was turned off too....no-one on the bridge would have known the depth of the water under their keel even if they wanted to know.

Who the heck had that essential equipment turned off has not been disclosed...yet.

When Schettino said "I take the conn" about six minutes before the collision, it is apparent that Schettino was in charge from that moment on. Why Schettino didn't go to the bridge earlier when he was called to do so is beyond belief. If he had been where he was supposed to have been and doing what he was paid to do, we wouldn't be having this discussion. Again, the conflicting orders happened AFTER the collision and would not have prevented the accident so it is a moot point.

Actually no it isn't moot at all.

There was a delay in giving the evacuation orders.

Considering the significant confusion over which way the ship was going...port or starboard...along with the language/comprehension problems...comes confusion and a certain amount of disbelief at what had just happened.

You have two officers shouting directional orders, you have an overwhelmed helmsman and alot of alarms, warning lights and general "this cannot be happening" type disbelief circulating throughout everyone on the bridge...all of them up there trying to get heads around the situation, trying NOT to panic but being so completely paralysed (which stress invariably bring on in the majority of people).

It is VERY important to focus on what happened in the minutes AFTER the collision...the chain reaction from various, often contradictory commands, the "disbelief" issues, the spatial disorientation and so forth....it will have taken a fair few minutes to snap out of the brain fog, realise what was happening, collect thoughts together and then act in an appropriate manner as per training.

When in the simulator, there is no pressure...you know that it is a computer generated situation and that you are not in any real danger per se. So when the brain fails to react within a certain amount of time, you can turn off the simulator, have it reboot (and yourself regain your composure) and start again.

But when the ship is real, the emergency is real and all around you are shouting contradictory orders, the alarms are sounding etc it is all too easy to lapse into helplessness, inadequacy and everything you learnt flies right out the window cos your body refuses to obey to what you are telling it to do.

There is no rebooting and starting again til you get it right...

So this confusion as to which way to go and the already hobbling effect of poor English comprehension are compounded by the ensuing and increasing chaos going on around you is most definitely NOT moot.

It shows a chain of command breaking down, it shows that everyone on the bridge were completely impotent. They were, no pun intended, out of their depth. As has been said for many years by aircraft pilots who have survived a crash, no amount of simulator training will EVER prepare you for the real thing.

From the tapes from the black box aboard Concordia, no-one took command & control of the situation that night...they ALL fell apart in varying degrees of total impotency...many acted out of fear, others were paralysed and unsure what to do, where to go....no-one took overall command, had someone snapped out of the chaos, the evacuation orders would have been released sooner and maybe less people would have died...but we cannot know that for sure.

It was obvious that there was no-one in overall command...Schettino was out of it, total disbelief at what just happened...and the rest of his officers and crew that night on the bridge were in a similar state to him. The wording of the phone calls to base showed that Schettino was completely shot mentally...he was no longer in command of himself, let alone Concordia.

They all fell to pieces, the chain of command fell to pieces and without that vital chain of command, all is lost....and that is why no evacuation order was given for such a long time...they couldn't get their heads around their own actions or what had happened so expecting them to issue orders to everyone else on board within a reasonable time was out of the question.

The confusion on that bridge, yes even before the accident with a helmsman with poor language skills, compounded what was already going to be a chaotic situation far, far worse.

CS,

 

Of course Schettino is going to try to save his own skin by blaming others. The fact remains that it happened AFTER and is immaterial. We don't know how well the helmsman,

Jacob Rusli Bin,

spoke English. It is safe to assume he knew the difference between Port and Starboard. It could very well be that he turned the right way after the correct order was given a second time. We do know from the experts' report that the ship is in the place it's in due to the wind and currents and not by any great manuvering on anyone's part after the collision. It is also apparent, judging from the intereviews Schettino has given, that Schettino's command of English leaves a lot to be desired.

Schettino is Neopolitan (born in Naples), the Neopolitan accent is extremely strong compared to the Sicilian or Ligurian accents...so just as the different accents in the USA or UK can sometimes leave the listener wondering "huh..what he say?"...the same goes for the various Italian accents too.

One thing concerning the helmsman's response...

Ambrosio called out "Hard to starboard", Schettino called out "Hard to port"....the helmsman replied "Hard to starboard?"

That sounds like the helmsman was taking orders from the man on duty...ie Ambrosio...which were contradicted by Schettino, who we know was supposedly downstairs with pax leading upto the last few moments before it all went pearshaped.

The fact that the helmsman questioned "Hard to starboard?" from Ambrosio, then Schettino repeated "Hard to port" a second time...it IS little wonder that the helmsman did not go either way immediately...he dithered...being told two things from two different people combined with a lack of understanding of language/accent caused a few seconds or minutes delay from receiving the first hard to port, the opposing hard to starboard which he questioned only to be answered by hard to port again...

You place yourself into that situation...you are standing at the joystick...in one ear you have hard to port, at almost the same time you hear hard to starboard from the other end of the bridge wing...you question hard to starboard from the first officer cos now the captain is back on the bridge and even off duty, you always listen to the captain cos he is ultimately the boss, who then repeats the hard to port....on top of this you have bells, whistles and general chaos as systems are indicating problems all around you....

It was sensory overload....with the added hindrances of heavy Italian accents that ALWAYS get thicker and more animated when under stress and your inability to understand English too well....

What are you left with....a bridge with no command chain, in chaos and panic/confusion ensues.

CS -

 

The confusion was AFTER the impact not before. This error would not have avoided the collision in any way.

 

GROSSETO, Italy: The captain of the Costa Concordia told his crew to turn the crippled ship one way while his second-in-command told them to steer it in the opposite direction, an audio recording has revealed.

In the chaotic moments immediately after the ship hit rocks off the island of Giglio in January, Captain Francesco Schettino shouted ''Hard to port!'' while his first officer, Ciro Ambrosio, shouted: ''Hard to starboard!''



The audio, taken from the ship's black box data voice recorder, emerged at the start of a court hearing in Grosseto, Tuscany, where the investigation into the disaster is taking place.



Read more: http://www.theage.com.au/world/concordia-captain-confused-directions-20121016-27p1q.html#ixzz29TGkN4H4

OK...remove the timeline side of things for a second...

You have the Captain saying one thing, a First Officer saying the opposite...and in the middle you have a helmsman who does not understand Italian at all and has sketchy (at best) English.

I totally "get" the confusion in the heat of the moment....but it leaves the question as to who was right...Captain or First Officer in regard to which way would have had a better outcome, especially since both were effectively hobbled by a helmsman with language difficulties?

Three supposedly trained individuals shouting opposing commands to a helmsman who doesn't truly understand what is being asked of him....THAT is a recipe for disaster WITHOUT adding in a rock or two....that situation is more worrying than anything else, worrying in that how many other ships have bridge crew that do not understand what is being asked of them and most importantly where the senior officers seemingly cannot agree as to which direction would be the safest in the event of a problem arising...

The chain of command issue is certainly there, but what is coming across as a much stronger "problem" is that you have these two qualified people barking out opposing orders to a supposedly equally trained individual who doesn't understand either of the orders and is so confused by the whole situation that an inevitable delay ensues whilst he tries to work out what he is meant to be doing and in which direction....it is little wonder the bridge disolved into total chaos.

It truly was an accident waiting to happen...it was ridiculous to have a helmsman - which is a highly responsible job - who did not understand English properly and did not understand Italian at all when working on an Italian registered ship with Italian officers. Made worse by two Senior Officers barking opposing orders thus confusing the helmsman even more.

Keeping a cool head in an emergency is essential but so is having people who can understand the languages being spoken....Concordia was a complete breakdown of communication when it mattered the most.

Audio from the black box, which was distributed on Monday by Italian consumer advocate group Codacons, reveals the moments of chaos on the bridge before the accident. Schettino can be heard bragging, “I love to do the fly-by near Giglio,” as he turned off the ship’s automatic steering to manually guide the cruiser. Moments later, he can be heard yelling “Hard to Port” at the helmsman when it became clear the ship was heading for disaster. The helmsman, who did not speak English or Italian fluently, responded, “Hard to Starboard?” in English. Schettino repeated the request to turn the ship to port, but the delay proved fatal. The judge in the preliminary hearing, Valeria Montesarchio, denied the request to subpoena the helmsman.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/10/16/costa-concordia-s-captain-s-culpability-in-crash-and-deaths-weighed-by-judge.html

Now...if the above is to be read correctly, the helmsman was told go to port, he misunderstood that and asked if he should go to starboard....erm...language barriers aside, how in the heck can you get your port and starboard muddled up as a helmsman (someone who is trained to know the difference tween right and left)?

And why has there been a block on having the helmsman appear...if not to make this whole episode look like a witch hunt?

The recording apparently shows that the helmsman was given an order, he did not understand that order so the original order was given again...by which time it was too late...and yet that helmsman is not being called to give his side of it, nor to have his qualifications/experience known or questioned.

If that helmsman had no ability to understand Italian and had limited English...what exactly was he doing on that bridge in the position that he assumed as helmsman...he is clearly underqualified in his language skills, so what else within his training is sub-par and just how much imput did his actions have in the events of that night?

How long had he been a helmsman, how long had he worked for Costa Crociere, where did he get his qualifications...all questions that NEED answers really.

Schettino WAS at fault, but with a helmsman who did not speak Italian, had a very patchy knowledge of English and appeared not to know the difference tween port and starboard...it kind of makes one scratch one's head as to what else was/is missing in bridge crew training and selection IN GENERAL within the shipping industry as a whole

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9598532/Costa-Concordia-captain-wants-his-job-back.html

 

Fracesco Schettino, the captain of the Costa Concordia has launched legal action to get his job back . . . .Capt Francesco Schettino is also claiming back pay . . . .

 

More at:

 

http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/articles/392918/20121010/schettino-costa-concordia-sues-sacked-company.htm

 

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5jzjg_98lqH8aZC-Dad_jtSLBHqqg?docId=CNG.193bd973fc839385e5b1011924952f86.351

No surprise there really.

I doubt he will get anywhere with it though, but the reasons are fairly obvious as to why he has done it.

Within 24 hours of the accident, Costa Crociere effectively threw him under the bus...long before ANY investigative evidence had come to light.

Over the last 9 months, it has become blindingly obvious that (as usual with accidents) there are far more than just one individual primary or secondary cause that led to what happened.

The bus throwing would almost certainly have been ordered by Miami...a typical move to shift the investigation and subsequently the blame away from corporate mistakes in training, officer selection procedures, equipment design/build and so forth.

The ship is badly designed...go on any of the Conquest/Concordia class and it doesn't take long to find questionable and ultimately design features...such as galleys that effectively cut potential escape routes in half over two decks midships....something that sadly is typical of "cut and shut" ships...whether they are lengthened by drawing board from an original template, or lengthened part way through their service life (Norwegian Dream is an absolutely awful example of this...having to go up or down decks to get around dining rooms/galleys and other crew only spaces in order to get from stem to stern).

The ship's systems that were suited to the Destiny footprint, that had ample redundancy to enable safe operation in the event of a power outtage or emergency has now been stretched almost to its limit by using the exact same setup in the larger variants of the class - this was shown with Carnival Splendor and Costa Concordia...little or no redundancy in any of the systems on board to allow for an emergency situation.

Bridge crew lacking in the ability to simply talk to each other, question orders that they might not feel comfortable with or having officers with heavy accents/different language to that of helmsmen...something highlighted recently on Concordia.

Officer selection and training...crew training...all has come under the spotlight, mistakes were definitely made from the top down...but it is standard industry training, not something that can be restricted to one cruise line or corporation. The "return to the cabin for lifejackets" has been standard procedure since 1912...there has never been a requirement to change it...til Concordia. The IMO are instigating several updates to SOLAS to cover for these problems, but they will take upwards of two years to be agreed upon and ratified...most cruise lines are going it alone in the meantime and changing rules to suit, in the hope that they won't be needed again during the ratification procedure at the IMO.

Equipment on the bridge...again, tis accident has shown some problems both in suitability and training, so that too will inevitably be getting a thorough overhaul.

The human element cannot be so easily put right. As with every industry, you can train a person to within an inch of their lives using simulators...and they are usually very effective training aids...BUT...they cannot replicate a real emergency situation, nothing can except that real emergency...so there is currently no way of telling how a well trained individual will deal with an emergency until they are placed into the real thing. A simulator is good but the person being trained knows that it is a simulator and thus he or she will always walk away, having saved the day unscathed...and that person's brain will not suffer the fear of the unknown or the brain fog that invaribaly descends when spatially disorientated.

In the same way we as passengers cannot be expected to behave in a cool, calm fashion...we can't all do it..as was shown on Concordia with people climbing the rails, pushing people out of the way etc.

Muster drills, as good as they are, can never be truly realistic...people go to them cos they have to and there is no fear factor during the drill, so a false sense of security is often ingrained.

The standard muster drill will likely be altered even more...personally I think it should be. Shut down the elevators, have disabled/elderly pax meet their allocated escape crew, have them go through the procedures of being carried up stairs...that way no-one will confused or afraid as much as those who didn't know what to do or where to go were on Concordia...it gives crew and pax practice and then should the worst happen, they know what to expect and can be more prepared.

The buck stopped with Schettino, and in the hierachy of the ship's crew that is absolutely correct and traditional.

He did make mistakes, he did allow his fear to over ride his duties but he was not the only part of that accident, he was a small part of what went wrong that night...so yes, as unpalatable as it is that he is suing Costa Crociere for wrongful dismissal, he was kicked to the kerb way too soon and in all likelihood to ensure that the investigation focussed on him rather than looking at the corporate mistakes that placed him there.

I, personally, do not use any glass elevators...no head for heights and that Towering Inferno film finished any ideas about using them for me. Give me a fully enclosed elevator or stairs every time....yep I have been stuck in an enclosed elevator a few times and it scared the wotsits out of me - mainly cos you are stuck in a steel box that you have no control over and its dangling several floors up in the dark/semi-darkness....but to be stuck in a glass bubble and to be able to see & hear what was happening in a situation like Concordia...nope...no can do.

So perhaps elevator safety in an emergency situation such as a severe list is also something that will be looked into, especially those jazzy glass bubbles.

One of many lessons and design considerations that will come from this accident....but I still won't use those glass elevators (when I stayed at the Mandarin Oriental for 4 days pre-cruise in 2010, the hotel had a cluster of glass elevators running up the center of the building, I used the service elevator that was tucked away in the bowels of the building cos those glass elevators were a no-go for me, the hotel management were fine about it and they said that I was not the first guest to refuse to use them, afterall its 23 floors, beehive shaped, so the service elevator was WELL used).

I am not a expert on passinger ship lifts' date=' but.............I would think there should be a design feature that if power dies the elevator somehow settles to the next deck and there is someway to open the doors...............seems like safety 101 to me!

 

AKK[/quote']

 

You would think that would be the case but it is not.

 

On a cruise last year the ship lost power for around 20 minutes off Salvador Bahia, there was a female pax in one of the glass elevators at the time and the elevator stopped tween decks 6 & 7. Maintenance arrived within minutes but they ended up opening the doors manually and a crewman climbing down into the capsule, a ladder was then passed down to him and the pax and they both climbed out of what was effectively the top half of the elevator doors. The elevator stayed in that position for the rest of the day, long after the power had been restored.

 

There is an escape hatch on the top of every elevator....but few people (pax) would know it was there or how to use it, its not something that people expect to have to know about really, let alone know how to use cos usually in those circumstances the emergency services (or crew) would be there to help you.

 

The ones trapped in the glass elevator(s) aboard Concordia would have seen and heard everything going on that night, the listing, waterlogging...and even if they knew about the hatch on the roof of the elevator...where would thay have gone even if they could have used it? The ship was heeled over thus the elevator wouls have been almost horizontal...quite a drop down into what would have been the landing on deck 4 or the atrium on deck 3, not to mention floating wreckage etc.

 

They will have been in that bubble watching everything around them and hearing all the noises associated with what was happening. At least in a standard enclosed elevator, it would be dark and thus all sense of what was happening would have been lost, so although no less frightening, at least you wouldn't see what was about to happen to you.

Yep - I looked at some of the articles last night too and didn't find anything that said victims were found in elevators with or without lifejackets. CostaSmurfette's article must have been one of the early accounts that ended up being incorrect.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/the-wrong-maps-doors-left-open-bad-wiring-is-this-why-costa-concordia-really-sank-7906895.html

Codacons, the Italian consumer group that is leading a class-action suit against Costa Cruises, yesterday joined the attack, claiming electrical problems may have contributed to the loss of several passengers, who are thought to have died in the stricken vessel's lifts. Codacons lawyer Giuliano Leuzzi said it was feared four victims may have drowned while trapped in the lifts.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9029866/Costa-Concordia-the-inside-story-of-the-night-of-Friday-January-13.html

Scroll down to MONIQUE MAUREK's account :

We didn’t have lifejackets and people were shouting that we should go up to Deck 4 to get some. There were people stuck in the lifts screaming so we climbed up the large staircase.

The point is that at least 4 were reportedly stuck in a glass lift at some point during the accident...personally I cannot think of a worse way to die that in what was a fishbowl of a glass lift gradually submerging in water with the inevitable water leaking inside and the people not being able to escape.

If the glass lift was tween decks 3 (atrium floor) and 4 (restaurant) then pretty much everyone who went across the atrium and the deck 4 landings will have seen these four struggling.

The two yet to be found COULD potentially be in one of the standard enclosed lifts on board, they have yet to be checked since its not safe to do so whilst the ship is at the angle she is currently at...they will be checked once she is drydocked.

Should it proven that people were trapped in the lifts, it was probably dismissed in the media as something they did not want family to consider or think about as it must be the most harrowing way to die possible.

Smurfette,

 

Would you provide a link to the report about the victims found in elevators, please?

 

I remember seeing a drawing at one time that showed the recovery efforts and where the bodies had been located, but don't recall anyone being found in the elevators. I do recall some survivors reporting that they had tried to help rescue an elderly woman, but that an inrush of water had sucked her out of their grasp and, I believe, down an elevator shaft. Perhaps, there is some confusion in the reporting that may simplify the question.

 

Regards,

MorganMars

Final paragraph : http://www.mid-day.com/news/2012/feb/260212-Rebello-family-keeps-fingers-crossed.htm

Four out of them were stuck inside the capsule lift on the same floor and that they had to break open the glass to remove the bodies. The search for the remaining seven missing people continues.

The "capsule lift" is one of the glass atrium elevators.

A timeline question for those in the know....

Something about the timeline does not equate.

We have been told that some victims were discovered inside the elevators with their lifejackets.

Question is how did they get there and when.

Since all elevators go offline in a power outtage...I know cos have been on a ship with a full outtage and the elevators all stopped and usually tween decks thus requiring manual intervention to get them to either the deck above or below.

So we have individuals with lifejackets inside elevators...

There is an alleged delay of 1 hour, give or take, tween initial power outtage and the evacuation orders given.

On that basis those inside the elevators with life jackets would not have retrieved them before the outtage...no reason to.

They had to have returned to the cabins DURING the outtage and then tried to reach their muster points DURING the supposed outtage and AFTER the evacuation alarm/instruction was given.

Now...all the speculation has buzzed around that power outtage and the length tween it and the evacuation orders...and there are many who say that the electrical systems were completely down during this time and only emergency gensets had kicked in, albeit slightly slower that anticipated.

How did these people not only ENTER the elevators but get tween decks when the elevators stopped when no elevators can be accessed or run on the emergency gensets?

If these people managed to get into the elevators and they tried to get to their muster point, and got part way there before expiring.....it means that the power was restored from the main gensets at some point.

This would also answer why the ship managed to turn and head for the beach, afterall, much has been said about the use of thrusters...they, like the elevators cannot be used on emergency gensets, they can ONLY be used on the main gensets.

So was there a complete and total power outtage from point of collision to point of list/beaching...or did the power supply get restored intermittantly allowing people to try and use the elevators to escape and the thrusters to be used in short bursts to enable the ship to be taken into landfall?

The elevator doors cannot be opened without special tools when the power supply is cut to them, so the power MUST have been restored for anyone other than crew to enter those elevators and for those elevators to have moved.

And the thrusters could have been used during the time that power was restored...even for a few minutes at a time and using the tide to turn the ship around, they MIGHT have been able to restore power long enough to turn the ship but at the same time passengers realised the elevators were working and they tried to use them as a means of escape.

Afterall, at muster drill and on the instructions on cabin doors it clearly says elevators must not be used, since it is wodely known that they are taken off the power supply in the event of a full emergency.

The power MUST have been restored and that would answer why there were people with lifejackets in the elevators and how the ship was turned around and placed where she is.

The Blame game widens!

 

http://crew-center.com/eight-crew-members-under-investigation-concordia-disaster

The aspect that needs close investigation is that the bridge officers and crew were hobbled by the language barrier...or at least the often very strong accents.

Having heard Schettino in person, his accent is not always easy to understand...while he and the others speak reasonable English, the accents can often get in the way and change what words sound like or mean...albeit inadvertantly.

You have an Indonesian helmsman taking orders from Italian officers...those Italian officers speak English but with regional accents, they are speaking to someone from Indonesia who himself has an accent and who uses English as a second language to his own "mother tongue".

So it would be quite feasible that Schettino asked for a certain course to be taken and the helmsman misunderstood what was said to him...thus the ship wandered 0.5 miles off the requested course.

Half a mile is not a huge length physically but in this case it meant a huge difference in what was safe and what was not safe.

It would be interesting to see what the written course notes were against what was actually said...AND heard...by the helmsman and how the helmsman interpreted those requests in his steering.

I know that an order given should be repeated by the person receiving it...to avoid mistakes, if nothing else...but if you have two very thick foreign accents, which afterall Indonesian and Italian are potentially very difficult to disipher and in the heat of the moment of giving that instruction, one or both parties could potentially misread or misunderstand what was said.

Again, this was a common problem in airline accidents where the command of English was frequently poor and the understanding of orders/requests was often misinterpreted...such as in the Avianca crash some years ago near New York, the plane was out of fuel but due to language and training differences the crew stated they had an "urgent" need to land, when in New York's control tower assumed they were OK for a while longer cos they did not state that they had an "emergency"....both urgent and emergency mean the same thing but can be misconstrued when under stress or when two very different accents and/or training is in place.

I think the level of training and most importantly the level of English spoken and understood will inevitably come under scrutiny and should bring about important changes in how officers are chosen, recruited and trained...and also how junior crew such as helmsmen are chosen, recruited and trained.

I have said all along that it is not so much the why's and wherefore's of this accident that are important, but the lessons learnt and the procedural changes made that will inevitably make cruising safer in the future.

I shall be spending a week aboard Costa Pacifica a couple of weks before Christmas this year, so since there are two formal Gala nights, these are the dresses that will be going with me....the blue/black is an Yves Calin, not sure who made the lilac one though....

I pass, couldn't have put it better myself.

 

David

Smurf, it just doesn't work that way in real life. Tattletales and informants can't save the world from some thing that has not happened yet.

What are they going to say to the company that made and trusted that person to be captain of the ship? "I think he drives too fast and takes risks". "Well no, he did'nt hit any thing". Should every company be forced to hire a few physic fortune teller employees that know what's going to happen in advance?

Get over it , it's not the crews fault for not " crying about Schettino as captain, It's Schettino's fault because he was in charge and Costa's fault for using very poor judgement in trusting him as capt of a ship with 4000 lives depending on him.

He obviously did not earn the respect of his crew but it is not their job to question the top brasses decision to make him captain.

Do you work in human resources?

Totally missing the point as per usual...par for the course around here though, so not exactly a surprise.

OK...simple English...

Four (4) weeks BEFORE the Giglio accident, Schettino was Captain of Concordia when he took a significant risk in leaving Marseille in a force 10...despite other Captains on other ships remaining in port and delaying their respective departures.

Schettino left Marseille at full tilt into a head wind. Fortunately the ship did not come to grief.

Now those same officers aboard Concordia in Marseille were on the bridge when Concordia hit the rocks on Giglio.

Those officers did not...DID NOT...complain about the Marseille departure until AFTER the Giglio accident.

Now....had those officers complained about Marseille either on the day or shortly thereafter then perhaps...just perhaps...we might not have had a tragedy 4 weeks later in Giglio.

Had they spoken up about Marseille instead of ignoring it, and had Head Office known that Schettino had taken a significant risk in Marseille, they would almost definitely have either removed Schettino as Captain or placed him under the watchful eye of a more senior Captain for guidance to ensure that Schettino did not make such errors again.

By saying that Schettino was a loose canon and dangerous is all fine and dandy after the accident, but it doesn't help matters nor does it bring back the 32 who died.

Those officers had 4 weeks tween Marseille and Giglio to speak out against Schettino, to voice any concerns or worries about his behaviour, perfomance or abilities.

They did not.

End result, Schettino was allowed to continue his own merry way totally uncensured and Concordia ends up holed and on her side with 32 bodybags on the quayside.

If only those officers HAD spoken out about Marseille...if they had done so, Giglio might never have happened.

So there is no psychic power required...Marseille happened PRIOR to Giglio...and Warnemunde happened PRIOR to Marseille.

They should have said something to someone about his risk taking and they did not do so.

Bet they wish they had done now...

4 weeks before Giglio something could have been done about Schettino had his critics actually spoken out about him.....4 weeks before he took a course for reasons best known to himself that killed 32 people.

4 weeks prior to the accident he left Marseille like a greyhound chasing a rabbit in a force 10 gale.

The same bridge officers were aboard Concordia that day as on the fateful night.

Not one of them spoke out about the way he tried to race a storm. Not one of them tried to stop him leaving Marseille in what were obviously bad conditions...bad enough to have captains aboard other cruise ships, ferries and freighters delay their departure.

Marseille suffers rip tides and frequently storm force winds across the Gulf de Lion.

Any competant captain would have held off til the winds had died down...but not Schettino...he sailed out of port regardless.

Had those fellow officers reported what had happened, chances are Schettino would have had a senior captain placed on board to monitor his behaviour, maybe even removed for retraining or re-evaluation...he certainly would not have been left in charge of the Concordia without some form of censure.

But his fellow officers turned a blind eye...just as they did aboard Costa Atlantica in Warnemunde.

4 weeks after leaving Marseille in stormy weather at full tilt, he hit rocks off Giglio resulting in 32 deaths.

As much as it is unforgiveable what he did that night, it is also unforgiveable that those around him covered for him, ignored him, turned a blind eye towards him just 4 weeks beforehand and previously aboard Costa Atlantica.

They could have prevented Giglio had they spoken up about him....

Four short weeks....that is all it was from being an idiot in Marseille to taking the lives of 32 passengers and crew and NO-ONE said a word...

Each and every officer and crewmember who worked with Schettino is culpable for what happened on January 13...they saw him make mistakes, they saw him make judgement errors and yet they did NOTHING.

Schettino stuffed it up royally...but so did his subordinates by turning that blind eye 4 weeks before.

So that would be a real inducement to bubble a guy they thought was a danger. Why don't you join the real world instead of spouting your evermore outlandish theories and what might have beens.

 

David

Get it right mate if you are going to pick fault.

What I said was that people ONLY spoke out about Schettino AFTER he killed 32 people, the KNEW he was a loose canon, they did NOTHING, said NOTHING until AFTER the event.

The reason for NOT saying a thing against him...and thus potentially saving those 32 lives is SIMPLE....

They have an ethos of NOT speaking out for fear of losing face, losing employment and losing any chance of re-employment due to be labelled a troublemaker or whistleblower or telltale.

So it is EASIER to ignore stupidity, EASIER to ignore errors of judgement...let the one making those errors and acting stupidly to continue doing so and then if by chance someone actually dies as a result, then come out with the "he was ALWAYS a friggin' idiot"..."he was ALWAYS a risk taker"..

For crying out loud Balf....

Whistleblowers are NOT welcome, they ARE persecuted for speaking out against a stupid or dangerous coworker.

They feel that it is safer to stay quiet and just hope to God that no-one dies....well on Concordia none of them hoped hard enough, did they?

32 people died cos a few people who knew that Scettino was a risk taker couldn't or wouldn't speak up...it took 32 people dying BEFORE they had the balls to speak out against him..

WHY DID THEY WAIT?

Cos they were bloody scared of recriminations from their employers and fellow employees...and that Balf, is the problem in almost every industry, sport and association/organisation...no-one dares to speak out against someone...or as you so elegantly put it "bubble them" cos they know that they will pay for doing so with their job and/or their reputation.

This level of intimidation needs to stop before more lives are lost as a result of coworkers not speaking out when someone cocks things up time and time and time again.

Yes, the relationships, titles and locations are well understood. But, unless I misunderstood what you wrote (and you do tend to go back and forth), you stated that they were all critical of Schettino before the night of the 13th.

Yep...they were all critical of Schettino...but as with every whistleblower, they kept quiet, they did not step up to the plate to their immediate superior's or head office bosses and voice their concerns about Schettino...

They waited til after the event and then came out with the "well...we always said he was a problem" speeches.

Any Tom, Dick or Harriet can come out and say these things after a cock-up...that doesn't do any good.

The problem is the fear of belittlement, disbelief, being labelled as a troublemaker, being overlooked for future promotion or even being sacked.

Given that so many industries and sports still outlaw those who dare be critical of others (especially high ranking others), the ethos of not speaking out when someone has made an error of judgement is rife.

This hiding behind the apron strings and only coming out and saying that someone isn't up to the job has got to stop...and maybe, just maybe, this accident will finally give other officers and senior rankings the cahunas to question an order, to tell a senior officer or manager that he or she did something risky...

Everyone who has been spoken to about Schettino and how he worked has come out with the "well we always knew he was an idiot"...well why the hell didn't they say it BEFORE things got so bad that 32 people had to die?

Boils down to basic fear of losing face, losing employment and losing any chance of re-employment due to be labelled a troublemaker or whistleblower or telltale.

Stella mare...

Palombo was on Giglio that night and it was he who put Schettino through his final training.

Pellegrino has basically shared his opinion of his former workmate/fellow officer.

Bosio was deadheading to Savona, he had been captain aboard Costa Serena.

Christidis, Ambrosio & Coronica were on the bridge of Concordia at the time of the accident...all three were on duty before, during and after the emergency...Christidis was in the same lifeboat as Schettino.

It's all well documented amongst the flotsam & jetsum.

What was the condition of the Valdes after the incident excluding the damage to the hull? Concordia would need engines and running gear as well as a load of other equipment. There are surely many ships standing idle worldwide that would be far cheaper to use.

 

David.

Concordia was a large ship...but the majority of the superstructure above the main hull is lightweight, non steel (keeps the weight down, thus allowing to build so high).

So once upright and in drydock, that superstructure will be shaved off...it is that part which has taken the brunt of the damage since she settled in her current position.

The hole(s) in the steel hull...not a problem...either replate or cut & shut (Valdez was a cut and shut...the damaged area cut out, hull welded back together, she was shorter than her original state but still able to return to work).

Powerplant requirement would be significantly less for a cattle carrier than a cruise ship...although to some there is little difference tween the two in regard to capacity.

Cut and shut has been done for years...and lets not forget that Concordia's hull is less than 10 years old she is still a very young ship, which goes on her side when it comes to making a decision about her future.

In the right hands, in the right yard she could be rebuilt and she could have a long life ahead of her. She wouldn't be the first CTL to come back from the dead. She still has alot going for her once you take away the lightweight upper structures and gut her hull out...get rid of all that and she could be viable. Once she is down to a bare hull without the superstructure, the damage will be better assessed...and after all is said and done, cabin modules etc can be built quickly too, the entire top decks could be rebuilt...

The options are endless as to what can be done with her...being a CTL is not a guaranteed end.

A reference was made a few pages back regarding Exxon Valdez...well she is about to be beached for the last time in India..having survived the rocks at the hands of her drunk captain, she has been repaired, renamed, reregistered and lots of things inbetween...she is to be beached at Alang and broken up for scrap...

http://www.bairdmaritime.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13323:exxon-valdez-scrapped&catid=111:general-shipping-news&Itemid=205

Not a bad life for what still remains one of the worst environmental disasters in US history.

Considering it was in 1989 when she was driven onto rocks, its taken quite a while for her to get broken up.....

Concordia could end up the same way...if someone offers her owners (the insurance company, not CCL since CCL relinquished ownership as soon as she was classed as CTL)...Concordia could end up as a livestock carrier, car carrier...ferry even...in some backwater region where no-one will have heard of her or her history.

Never say never....old Concordia could well rise again...maybe a bit shorter (as per Exxon Valdex)...but she could come back as a whole new ship if the price is right.

Because real life does not work that way. Most of us have had work colleges who we knew were less than competent to do the job, but it takes a very brave guy to complain to management. Why do you think it has taken 13 years for Lance Armstrong's fellow riders to to blow the whistle?

 

David

And the reason is simple.

No-one likes a whistleblower.

Companies, organisations, teams...hate whistleblowers, they belittle them, they disbelieve them and if anyone DOES have the balls to stand up and whistleblow, they suddenly find themselves sidelined not just by those they work with but sidelined from the entire industry (or sport).

The aviation industry changed their ways after countless accidents where fellow officers couldn't or wouldn't question the actions of a colleague on the flightdeck.

This accident, and the two other (known about, for all anyone knows there could well be more than two previous incidents...chances are that there are more than two others) incidents involving Schettino have happened almost entirely due to those around him not feeling they would be listened to, believed or through pure fear against losing face or their employment had they spoken up about his obvious failings and unsuitability as a captain.

Get rid of the anti-whistleblower ethos that is rife in certain industries, sports etc and you will go a long way to get rid of human error that leads to accidents. The longer people cannot or will not speak up when they see something wrong, the more people will die as a result.

It's as simple as that.

The Giglio accident was Schettino's THIRD known brush.

First was aboard Atlantica as he entered Rostock/Warnemunde.

Second was 4 weeks before the accident aboard Concordia when he left Marseille.

Third was also aboard Concordia at Giglio.

All done in the short time that he had upgraded from Staff Captain to full Captain.

Which begs the question, surely, was he READY to have the proverbial trainer wheels taken off....he seemed to get ahead of himself on three occasions, the previous two occasions did not get any form of censure from his superiors, so it is quite likely that he thought he had done no wrong...til his third brush.

The sail-by at Giglio was for Palombo's benefit....the same Palombo who told media that he "had reservations about his (Schettino) abilities".

Is it not possible therefore that Schettino, knowing that Palombo didn't much care for his style of captaincy, went for the sail-by as a way of "I'll SHOW you how good I am"?

Afterall, Palombo made it perfectly clear that despite training Schettino, he didn't much care for the man or his abilities....and what about another bridge officer on Concordia that night, his opinion of Schettino "he drove a ship like it was a Ferrari", Pellegrino also stated that Schettino was "a tough authoritarian" too.

So this accident was GOING to happen eventually...Schettino was not only allowed to continue as an unmonitored captain after two previous mistakes within a short space of time, but he was also dealing with two-faced fellow officers and superiors.

After running too fast into Rostock/Warnemunde, after leaving Marseille in force 10 winds when the other cruise ships remained in port for their safety....these two incidents should have proved that Schettino WAS NOT captaincy material.

However, it was missed or ignored and he went on to Giglio on that fateful night in January and finally he was stopped in his tracks...but not until he had a catastrophic accident that cost lives.

If Palombo, Pellegrino, Bosio, Christidis, Ambrosio & Coronica...and the others who worked with him...were so critical of his abilities and captaincy BEFORE the Giglio accident, the question MUST be asked as to why they did not say something sooner...had they of done, chances are that the accident WOULD NOT have happened.