Concordia News: Please Post Here

[SomeBeach]

Water, appreciate you doing the translation for us.

Will take some time later to read what you have provided.

[Uniall]

I will continue to translate and post if anyone is interested - or we can wait for a link in english.

 

Keep up the great work...........

[watertheodds]

Page 4 & 5

 

 

 

- Not running, by decision in ample time and with due respect for the rules of good

maritime art, each appropriate maneuver to avoid a collision the ship in a shallow,

so as to open a hole in the left side of the hull (and therefore also in breach of Rule n. 8

this regulation Colreg); - Omitting, while aware of immediacy (since the 21:46) colliding with a shallow and the presence of a leak, to run the code signal Delta - X-ray and to activate, direct and coordinate the subsequent procedure antifalla (and therefore in breach of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) Leg.

July 27, 1999 n. 271, not minimizing the risks to workers and implementing, with due diligence, the procedures provided in cases of emergency, particularly for the abandonment of the ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by Decree of the President of the Republic on November 8 1991, no. 435, The Role of Appeals approved pursuant to art. 203, Presidential Decree 435/1991 cit., The

Rule 37, Chapter III of the Convention SOLAS and in violation of the provisions of

Section 4.1 - Collision / Falla procedure P12.04 SMS - Safety Management on Board - Operating Instruction - Decision Support System for the Commander); - Failing to put in execution the procedures to isolate the watertight compartments flooded and the specific failing to have, in addition to the closing of watertight doors, all the other "measures to be taken in the event of flooding of watertight compartments "under the Damage Control Plan) (n. design ANN 330 390), edited by Fincantieri - Cantieri Navali Italian Spa (in particular, the closure - to be carried out by the Engine Control Room or on site - the valves of subdivision 25-26-27-28-29-31-32-33-34 number and closing the doors semi-dry / splash doors, number 5-6-7 - 8) and also by failing to have the additional "measures to be taken in the event of flooding," provided by Damage Control Booklet (n. design ANN 330 391), edited by Fincantieri - Cantieri Navali Italian Spa (in particular, the closure of the hydraulic boccaportello - so-called "hatch" or hatch cover – place 0 to bridge between the ordinate 116 and the ordinate 120, the left side, by acting manually on the device closing placed near the left side ordinate 116), so as to allow further progression flooding;

- By failing to activate the Operations Centre - COP, composed of second in command, the first official machine and the first electrician, to be sent on the premises concerned to check the damage reported (Including identifying specific compartments flooded), and to activate one or more Control Teams Damage - SCD, to proceed to the subsequent steps necessary, and omitting also to coordinate then the following operations (and therefore in breach of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit., not minimizing the risks to workers and implementing, with diligence, the procedures in cases of emergency, particularly for the abandonment of the ship, as indicated in the current safety regulation adopted by the Presidential Decree 435/1991 cit., As well as of that role and Appeals of this procedure IO2 SMS P12.04); - By failing to appoint a Ship Crisis Coordinator - SCC director for communications with the company ship owner relating to the state of emergency, so as to be able to devote only to the management emergency itself (and therefore in breach of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit.,

not minimizing the risks to workers and implementing, with diligence, the procedures set out in emergencies, particularly for the abandonment of the ship, as indicated in the current Regulation Safety adopted with the D.P.R. 435/1991 cit., And paragraphs 4.3 and 4.6.1 of the procedure SMS P15.6 IO 01 - Marine Operations Operating Instruction - Crisis Management Preparedness Plan - Operational and Reporting Procedures)

- By failing to provide the Crisis Committee Shipside - CCShip (Crisis Unit on board), in the persons the second in command, the chief engineer and the hotel director, and omitting, however, to ensure the necessary flow of information in favor of such persons in their respective areas of competence, so as to be able to use their technical and management support (and therefore in breach of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit., not minimizing the risks to workers and not

implementing, with diligence, the procedures in cases of emergency, particularly for the abandonment the ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by the Presidential Decree 435/1991 cit., And paragraphs 4.3 and 4.6.13 of this procedure P15.6 SMS IO 01); - Omitting initially, since the 21:58 hours, and then still excessively delaying issuing the general emergency signal and in any case not privileging, in case of emergency, the Protection physical integrity of persons on board, so that the picking of passengers and crew at muster stations assigned to each and boarding the boats of

rescue, after verification of the presence of all the people take on board themselves, were ese5 guite without discipline, coordination, efficiency and timeliness appropriate and necessary (and therefore in violation of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit., not minimizing the risks for workers and implementing, with diligence, the procedures in cases of emergency, particularly

to abandon ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by the Presidential Decree 435/1991 cit., And paragraph 4 - Operating Modes - SMS of this procedure P12.04 - I02 and paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 of the procedure SMS P12.04 IO 08); - By failing to give yourself the communication on general and emergency still allowing the general emergency was given irritualmente and without the necessary notices complementary (and therefore in violation of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit., not minimizing the risks

for workers and implementing, with diligence, the procedures in cases of emergency, particularly to abandon ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted

with the D.P.R. 435/1991 cit., And paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.1.4 of the procedure SMS P12.04 IO 08); - By failing to notify the Technical Advisor the event of a claim, any subsequent duty to update (And therefore in breach of the Emergency Plan for Border against Pollution from Mineral Oils, prepared in accordance with Regulation 37, Annex 1 of the International Convention for the Prevention Pollution Caused by Ships - International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships - MARPOL, and paragraph 4.1 of this procedure SMS P12.04 - I02); - Omitting initially and still delaying excessively to emit signals pan pan, before, and distress and mayday, then, so that the external relief coordination could not occur with sufficient speed and efficiency (and therefore in breach of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit., not minimizing the risks to workers and implementing, with diligence, the procedures provided in cases of emergency, particularly for the abandonment of the ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by the Presidential Decree 435/1991 cited above. As well as provided point 4 - Operating Modes - SMS of this procedure P12.04 - I02); - By repeatedly communicate to passengers and crew, with multilingual ad Intercom - That still allows them to be so communicated - and false information such as prevent the timely and proper conduct of subsequent operations at collection muster stations and to abandon the ship and, in particular, by reporting only a blackout, when already was fully aware that the ship had sprung a leak and that the large size of some local - Including the one that housed the main electrical panel - were flooded (and therefore in breach Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit., not minimizing the risks to workers and

not in motion, with diligence, the procedures in cases of emergency, particularly for

abandon ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by the

Presidential Decree 435/1991 cit., As well as the provisions of paragraph 4 of this procedure SMS P12.04 - I02, not promoting, in an emergency, protect the physical integrity of persons on board); - Adding to the list to the starboard side of the ship, the anchor appennellando starboard and blocking the first is touching the bottom;

- By failing to give in time, since (at the latest) by 22:10 hours, the order to abandon ship, so that operations for launching the lifeboats were made late, even taking

account of the increasing inclination of the ship, and in any case without the discipline, coordination, efficiency and timeliness appropriate and necessary (and therefore in breach of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit., not minimizing the risks to workers and implementing, with diligence, the

procedures provided in cases of emergency, particularly for the abandonment of the ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by the Presidential Decree 435/1991 cited above. As well as provided to in paragraph 4 of the above procedure SMS P12.04 - I02, not favoring, in case of emergency, protect the physical integrity of persons on board); - Omitting then personally give the order to abandon ship and still allowing a concise statement to that effect, without the necessary warnings also complementary, was irritualmente given by the second in command Roberto Bosio (and therefore in breach of Articles. 7, letter. e) and by paragraph 8. g) of Legislative Decree no. 271/1999 cit., not minimizing the risks to workers and implementing, with diligence, the procedures provided in cases of emergency, particularly for the abandonment of the ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by the Presidential Decree 435/1991 cit., And the Rule 37, Chapter III of the Convention SOLAS and paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.1.5 of this procedure SMS P12.04 IO 08); - Providing that the operations for launching the lifeboats were performed initially only the starboard side, so that when the ship has suffered a further tilt to starboard, is

[watertheodds]

pages 6 & 7

 

has made it impossible to fall to sea three lifeboats and life rafts put some on the side

left and the passengers are forced to come down from these vessels and move to the side starboard, when already was difficult to move on board (and therefore, not favoring, in case of emergency, protect the physical integrity of persons on board, in violation of the provisions of paragraph 4 of this procedure SMS P12.04 - I02) - caused the shipwreck and the partial submersion of Costa Concordia (who at 21:45:07 was going to collide with a shallow water near the rocks The denominated Scole - bringing a deformation of the hull of the length of 52.943 meters, a laceration the main length of 35.859 meters and area of ​​70.85 square meters with a consequent indented water of thousands of cubic meters per minute, in addition to a laceration of the secondary

length of 1.12 meters and a height of about 5 inches - so lost the buoyancy and

Stability and ended up running aground and partially overturned about thirty meters from the tip of Gabbianara) and also caused the death of:

1. Francis Servel (passenger, who, having found a place on the lifeboats, he threw himself into the sea, without a life jacket, in the waters off the location Gabbianara and sucked down towards the bottom from the vortex produced by the final tip on the right side of the ship, then died of asphyxiation from drowning);

2. Jean Pierre MICHEAUD (passenger, who, having found a place on the boats, threw himself into or sea, though you fell without life jackets, in the waters off the resort

Gabbianara, and then died of asphyxiation by drowning);

3. Tomas Alberto COSTILLA MENDOZA (crew member with the grade of cabin steward on duty the bridge n. 6, stern area, left side, which - by failing to find a place on boats

rescue, fell or threw himself into the sea, without having properly fastened life jacket -

died of asphyxiation by drowning in the waters off the location Gabbianara);

4. John MASIA (passenger, who, having found a place on the boats deck 4, the left side, was addressed by members of the crew on the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the corridor inside the vessel near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, fell into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the definitive reversal on the right side of the ship same, falling in a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 5. Guillermo Bual GUADES (passenger, who, having found a place on the lifeboats, while he was through the corridor inside the ship near the atrium elevators aft and Restaurant Milan, fell into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the final rolled over on the right side of ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxia drowning); 6. Egon Hor (passenger, who, having found a place on the boats deck 4, the left side has attempted to move to the right side of the same bridge to search for a means to abandon the ship, but, while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near the atrium elevators aft Restaurant and Milan, has fallen into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the final tipping on the side right of the ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the deck 4, and then up the corridor place on deck 2, in front of the cabin 2424, died of asphyxiation by drowning); 7. Sandor FEHER (crew member with duties as a musician, who, not having found a place the boats to deck 4, the left side, he tried to move to the right side of the same bridge looking a means to abandon ship and, while he was crossing the hall inside the ship near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, fell into the abyss prodottasi a sequel the final tip on the right side of the ship, falling into a flooded area the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 8. Jeanne Yvonne GANNARD (passenger, who, together with his brother Emile André Pierre Gregoire, not having found a place on the boats deck 4, the left side was addressed by members crew on the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the corridor within of the ship near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, has fallen into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the final tip on the right side of the ship, falling in an area flooded the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 9. Emile André Pierre GREGOIRE (passenger, who, along with her sister Yvonne Jeanne Gregoire Gannard, not having found a place on the boats deck 4, the left side, was addressed by members crew on the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the corridor within of the ship near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, fell into the abyss pro7 dottasi sequel to the final tip on the right side of the ship, falling in an area flooded the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 10.Josef WERP (passenger, who, together with his wife Brunhild Werp, failed to find a place on lifeboats and, while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, fell into the abyss prodottasi a retinue of final tip on the right side of the ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same

Deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning, while wearing a life jacket);

11.Horst GALLE (passenger, who, together with his wife Margrit Schroeter, failed to find a place the lifeboats, and while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near

atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, fell into the abyss prodottasi a retinue of

final tip on the right side of the ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same Deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning, while wearing a life jacket); 12.Luisa Antonia Virzi (passenger, who, not having found a place on the lifeboats, while waiting to be brought to safety on deck 4, the starboard side, while wearing a life jacket, is slid into the sea due to the gradual slope of the ship on the starboard side and it is so dead asphyxiation by drowning); 13.Maria D'Introno (clouds, which, after rising of one of the lifeboats of the bridge 4, the left side, and being forced to go back on board because the excessive inclination not allowed to fall into the sea the boat, has been directed toward the right side of the same axle 4, by where she was forced by the growing flood to throw into the sea wearing a life jacket but not knowing to swim, so died of asphyxiation by drowning in the waters off the resort Gabbianara); 14.Gabriele Maria GRUBE (passenger, who, not having found a place on the boats deck 4, side left, he tried to move to the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, without wearing a life jacket, fell into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the definitive reversal on the right side of the ship itself, precipitating a flooded area of ​​the same bridge 4 and is so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 15.Inge SCHALL (clouds, which, not having found a place on the lifeboats to the deck 4, the left side, has attempted to move to the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, has fallen into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the final tip on the right side of the ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning, while wearing life jacket); 16.Siglinde Stumpf (passenger, who, not having found a place on the lifeboats, while wearing a life jacket, it's over in an area now flooded the ship and it is so dead asphyxiation by drowning and ended up near the garden starboard bridge 3); 17.Erika Fani SORIA MOLINA (crew member with qualification cocktail waitress in service on No bridge. 5, Wine Bar Budapest, which - after attempting to leave the ship on board a raft and be falling overboard without a life jacket - sucked to the bottom of the abyss the final product rolled over on the right side of the ship, died of asphyxiation by drowning in the waters off the location Gabbianara);

18. Mylène Lisiane Marie Therese Litzler (passenger, who - along with fellow Michael Blemand - Has been addressed by crew members on the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the corridor inside the vessel near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, has fallen into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the definitive reversal on the right side of the ship same, falling in a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4, while wearing a life jacket, and so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 19.Michael BLEMAND (passenger, who - together with his partner Mylène Lisiane Marie Therese Litzler - Has been addressed by crew members on the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the corridor inside the vessel near the atrium elevators aft and Restaurant Milan, fell into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the final rolled over on the right side of ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4, while wearing a life jacket, and so died of asphyxia

[watertheodds]

pages 8 & 9

 

20. Williams Arlotti (passenger, who, together with her daughter Dayana Arlotti, not having found a place lifeboats on the bridge 4, the left side, has been addressed by crew members on the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near the atrium elevators Stern and Ristorante Milano, fell into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the definitive reversal on the right side of the ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4, without wearing a life jacket, and so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 21. Dayana Arlotti (passenger, who, along with his father Williams Arlotti, not having found a place lifeboats on the bridge 4, the left side, has been addressed by crew members on the right side of the same bridge, and while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near the atrium elevators Stern and Ristorante Milano, has fallen into the abyss that occurred in the final sequel tipping on the right side of the ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 22. Elisabeth BAUER (passing, which did not find place on the lifeboats, while he was crossing the corridor inside the vessel near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, has fallen into the abyss that occurred in the final sequel rolled over on the right side of the ship same, falling in a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning); 23. Brunhild WERP (passenger, who, with her husband Josef Werp, has failed to find a place on the lifeboats and, while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, has fallen into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the definitive tipping on the right side of the ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same Deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning, while wearing a life jacket); 24. Margrit SCHROETER (passenger, who, with her husband Horst Galle, was unable to find a place on lifeboats and, while he was crossing the hall inside the vessel near atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, has fallen into the abyss prodottasi sequel to the definitive

tipping on the right side of the ship, falling into a flooded area of ​​the same Deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning, while wearing a life jacket); 25. Margarethe NETH (passing, which did not find place on the lifeboats, while he was crossing the corridor inside the vessel near the atrium elevators aft and Ristorante Milano, has fallen into the abyss that occurred in the final sequel rolled over on the right side of the ship same, falling in a flooded area of ​​the same deck 4 and so died of asphyxiation by drowning);

26. Giuseppe Girolamo (crew member with duties as a musician, who, having found

place the boats to deck 3, left side, was directed by crew members on the right of that bridge and, after having sold his place on a lifeboat to help boarding of other passengers, then died of asphyxiation by drowning in the waters off the Gabbianara location); 27. Barbara Ann HEIL (passenger, who, with her husband, Gerald Frank Heil, failed to find place on the lifeboats and, dropping or falling down into the sea while wearing a life jacket, sucked down towards the bottom of the abyss from the final product rolled over on the right side of ship is then died of asphyxiation by drowning in the waters off the location Gabbianara); 28.Norbert Josef GANZ (passenger, who, together with his wife Cristina Mathilde Ganz, failed to find a place on the lifeboats and fell or threw himself into the sea while wearing the vest rescue, sucked down towards the bottom of the abyss final product from tilting on its right side of the ship who died in the waters off the location Gabbianara for cardio-renal

acute respiratory irreversible traumatic thoracic spinal fracture in conjunction with asphyxia drowning); 29.Gerald Frank HEIL (passenger, who, with his wife Barbara Heil, failed to find a place the lifeboats and fell or threw himself into the sea while wearing a life jacket, sucked down towards the bottom of the abyss from the final product rolled over on the right side of ship is then died of asphyxiation by drowning in the waters off the location Gabbianara); 30.Cristina Mathilde GANZ (passenger, who, with her husband Norbert Josef Ganz, failed to find a place on the lifeboats, and, dropping or falling down into the sea in the waters off the resort Gabbianara - without wearing a life jacket - and sucked down towards the bottom of the abyss product the final tip on the right side of the ship, then died of asphyxiation by drowning); 31.Maria Grace Trecarichi (passenger, who, not having found a place on the lifeboats, while waiting to be brought to safety on deck 4, the starboard side, while wearing the vest saving, it slid into the sea due to the gradual slope of the ship and is thus likely died asphyxiation by drowning);

32.Russel Terence Rebello (crew member with duties of maids room, which - remained

the ship to provide operations for launching the latest life-rafts on deck 4, side right aft, fell or threw himself into the sea due to the final reversal of the ship, died in the waters off the location Gabbianara, probably due to asphyxia by drowning);

 

as well as personal injury:

 

157 personal injuries - mostly post tramatic stress, bone injuries, bruising, anxiety, tachycardia etc - if anyone wants the full list I have it.

[cruiserfanfromct]

I will continue to translate and post if anyone is interested - or we can wait for a link in english.

 

Thanks WTO! Much appreciated!

[watertheodds]

breaks in pages now because the list of deaths and injuries are repeated - this is the next of the charges:

 

 

 

AMBROSIO

b) 402, 113, 4492, in reference to art. 428, and cp 5892-4, for - as chief mate of ship Costa Concordia, the head of the watch between 20.00 and 24.00 hours (and therefore primarily responsible at all times for the safe navigation of the ship, and respect for international regulations for Preventing Collisions at sea, in accordance with Rule 13, Part 4.1, Section A-VIII / 2 of the Convention International Standards of Training, Enabling and Sealing Guard for Maritime - International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers - STCW) and then in the suborder after the assumption of command by Francesco Schettino, in cooperation

with Francesco Schettino, Jacob Rusli Bin and Silvia Coronica and Manrico Giampedroni and Roberto Ferrarini - because consisted of carelessness, negligence and incompetence and violation of laws, regulations,

orders and disciplines and, in particular, by failing to provide the necessary support and the necessary assistance to the captain Francesco Schettino, after he had taken personal command, or in any case by failing to cooperate in the safety of the ship and persons on board; and therefore in breach of Article. 190 c.n. In particular, and among other things: - Following, until it was found in the ownership of the guard, a route different from the one planned officer cartographer Simone Canessa (and therefore in breach of Rule 25, Part 4.1, Section A-VIII / 2 of the STCW Convention);

- Omitting, until he had the ownership of the guard (especially after it has been given the order to "Rudder by hand"), to prepare a proper look (and therefore also in breach of the

Rule no. 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea - International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea - Colreg and the Rule II/1.4 (a) of the Convention STCW); - Allowing the commander to assume ownership of the maneuver without having previously had cognizance of the ship's actual or estimated, the position and speed of the ship, current conditions weather and generally the situation of navigation, including the operational conditions of all equipment for navigation and safety in use or that must or may be used during guard, and included also the conditions and risks that could have been met (and therefore violation of Rules 19, 21 and 22, Section A-VIII / 2, Part 4.1 of the Convention STCW); - By failing to maintain an appropriate exchange of communications in every situation and in particular

failing to inform the commander about the danger inherent in maintaining, in navigation in narrow waters and the bow almost perpendicular to the coastline, a speed close

to 16 knots, despite the proximity of obstacles, the presence of shallow water, the maneuverability of the ship - with special reference to stopping distance and turning ability in the conditions of time - and the night time (and therefore also in breach of Rule 8, Part 3.8, Section A-VIII / 2 of the Convention STCW); - By failing to maintain an appropriate exchange of communications in every situation and in particular

failing to inform the commander about the danger of approaching excessive and unjustified the coast of Isola del Giglio, deviating from the route previously drawn

in adjustment to the original, and not perceiving - either directly or through the instrumentation board - the presence of rocks and shoals near the new route (and therefore also in violation Rule 7 of the Rules Colreg and Rule 8, Section A-VIII / 2, Part 3.8 of This Code STCW); - By failing to take any necessary information from the radar, while browsing the coast, to control continuity with the position of the vessel, in particular since the remarkable points to the ground 15th were not clearly visible, and then failing to report such information to the commander (and therefore in violation of paragraph 4.3.9 of the SMS procedure P 14 MAN 01 - manual handling navigation

- Procedures for the dashboard - Navigation Management, Standard orders for the Officer of the Watch Bridge and Rule 8, Section A-VIII / 2, Part 3.8 of that Code STCW);

- By failing to maintain an exchange of appropriate communication in every situation and in particular not promptly reporting any appropriate maneuver to avoid collision of the ship against a low backdrop, which opened a hole tens of meters long on the left side of the hull (and therefore also in violation of Rule 8 of the Rules Colreg and Rule 8, Section A-VIII / 2, Part 3.8 of that Code STCW); - However caused or contributed to cause the wreck and the partial submersion of Costa Concordia (who at 21:45:07 was going to collide with a shallow water near the rocks called The Scole - bringing a deformation of the hull of the length of 52.943 meters, a laceration the main length of 35.859 meters and area of ​​70.85 square meters with a consequent indented water of thousands of cubic meters per minute, in addition to a laceration of the secondary length of 1.12 meters and a height of about 5 inches - so lost buoyancy and stability and ended to run aground and capsize partially about thirty meters from the tip of Gabbianara) and caused or at any rate also contributed to cause the death of:

 

list of deaths and injuries

[watertheodds]

Coronica

c) 402, 113, 4492, in reference to art. 428, and cp 5892-4, for - as the third mate on the

ship Costa Concordia, in the suborder watch between 20.00 and 24.00 hours, in cooperation with Francesco Schettino, Ciro Ambrosio and Jacob Rusli Bin and Manrico Giampedroni and Roberto Ferrarini - Because consisted of carelessness, negligence and incompetence and violation of laws, regulations, orders and disciplines and, in particular, by failing to provide the necessary support and the necessary assistance

the captain Francesco Schettino, after he had taken personal command, or however, failing to cooperate in the safety of the ship and persons on board, and therefore

infringement of Article. 190 c.n. In particular, and among other things: - By failing to maintain an appropriate exchange of communications in every situation and in particular

failing to immediately inform the holder of the guard on the danger inherent in maintaining, navigation in narrow waters and the bow almost perpendicular to the coastline, a speed close to 16 knots, despite the proximity of obstacles, the presence of shallow, maneuverability the ship - with special reference to stopping distance and turning ability in the conditions of the moment - and the night time (and therefore also in breach of Rule 8, Part 3.8, Section AVIII / 2 of the International Convention on Standards of Training, Enabling and seal of the

Guard for Maritime - International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers - STCW);

- By failing to maintain an appropriate exchange of communications in every situation and in particular failing to inform the commander about the danger of approaching

excessive and unjustified the coast of Isola del Giglio, deviating from the route previously drawn in adjustment to the original, and not perceiving - either directly or through the instrumentation board - the presence of rocks and shoals near the new route (and therefore also in violation Rule 7 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea – International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea - Colreg and Rule 8, Section A-VIII / 2, Part 3.8 of the

above STCW Convention); - By failing to take any necessary information from the radar, while browsing the coast, to control

continuity with the ship's position (including determining the ship's position on a regular basis), in particular since the remarkable points on the ground were not clearly visible, and then failing to report such information to the commander (and therefore in breach of paragraph 4.3.9 of the procedure SMS P 14 MAN 01 - Management of the navigation manual - Procedures for the dashboard - Navigation Management, Standard orders for the Watch Officer of the Bridge and the Rule 8, Section A-VIII / 2, Part 3.8 of This Code STCW); - By failing to maintain an appropriate exchange of communications in every situation and in particular not promptly reporting any appropriate maneuver to avoid collision of the ship against a shallow water, opening a hole tens of meters long on the left side of the hull (and therefore also in violation of Rule 8 of the Rules Colreg and Rule 8, Section A-VIII / 2, Part 3.8 of that Code STCW), -

- Not realizing that, although he had left the station in front of the radar to verify the correct execution orders of the steering wheel Jacob Rusli Bin - error committed by the latter, when, under the command of "Port Ten" ("Ten degrees to the left") and "Port Twenty" ("Twenty degrees to the left") given by the captain Francesco Schettino, respectively, at 21:44:44 and 21:44:46, led instead steering wheel until 19.9 ° to starboard, then perceiving themselves of the error to 21:44:55; 24th

- However caused or contributed to cause the wreck and the partial submersion of Costa Concordia (who at 21:45:07 was going to collide with a shallow water near the rocks called The Scole - bringing a deformation of the hull of the length of 52.943 meters, a laceration the main length of 35.859 meters and area of ​​70.85 square meters with a consequent indented water of thousands of cubic meters per minute, in addition to a laceration of the secondary length of 1.12 meters and a height of about 5 inches - so lost the buoyancy and Stability and ended up running aground and partially overturned about thirty meters from the tip of Gabbianara) and caused or at least contributed to cause the death of also:

 

Same list of deaths and injuries

[watertheodds]

In Giglio, the night between 13 and 14 January 2012.

 

 

RUSLI BIN

d) 113 and 4492, in reference to art. 428, and cp 5892-4, for - as sailor of the ship Costa Concordiain the suborder watch between 20.00 and 24.00 and assigned to the rudder from 21:35 hours, in cooperation with Francesco Schettino, Ciro Ambrosio and Silvia Coronica - because consisted in carelessness, negligence and incompetence and violation of laws, regulations, orders and disciplines. In particular, and among other things: - By failing to give timely execution of the orders of "Port Ten" ("Ten degrees to the left") and "Port Twenty "(" Twenty degrees to the left ") given by the captain Francesco Schettino, respectively, 21:44:44 and 21:44:46 hours, and in particular taking the helm up to 19.9 ° to starboard, perceiving themselves error at 21:44:55 and then turning the wheel to the left, setting at 19.5 degrees to the left, only to 21:44:57 -

caused or contributed to cause the wreck, however, and the partial submersion of Costa

Concordia (who at 21:45:07 was going to collide with a shallow water near the rocks called The Scole - bringing a deformation of the hull of the length of 52.943 meters, a laceration the main length of 35.859 meters and area of 70.85 square meters with a consequent indented water of thousands of cubic meters per minute, in addition to a laceration of the secondary length by 1.12 meters with a height of about 5 cm - so lost buoyancy and stability and ended to run aground and capsize partially about thirty meters from the tip of Gabbianara) and caused or at any rate also contributed to cause the death of:

 

Same list of deaths and injuries

[watertheodds]

I think this one is really interesting...........

 

 

 

GIAMPEDRONI

f) 402, 113 and CP 5892-4, for - as a hotel director of the ship Costa Concordia, in cooperation with Francesco Schettino and Roberto Ferrarini - because consisted of carelessness, negligence and incompetence and in violation of laws, regulations, orders and disciplines and, in particular, by failing to provide the necessary support and the necessary assistance to the captain Francesco Schettino, however, that omitting to cooperate in the safety of the ship and persons on board, and therefore in breach of Article. 190 c.n. In particular, and among other things: - Omitting (even in the absence of formal activation of the procedure antifalla, since he is well aware the presence of leak above) to take action as responsible for the evacuation of the cabin and areas of the passengers and crew of the vertical zone affected by the leak, getting updates by all personnel involved in the operations, communicating with the master and updating constantly (and therefore in breach of Article. 8, letter. g) of Legislative Decree no. Jul. 27, 1999 n. 271, having failed to implement, diligently, the procedures in cases of emergency, particularly for the abandonment of ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by Decree of the President Republic November 8, 1991, n. 435, and the Role of Appeals approved pursuant to art. 203, Presidential Decree 435/1991 cited above.); - Letting the commander Schettino did repeatedly communicate to passengers and crew, with multilingual ad by intercom, and false information that may prevent the timely and regular conduct of subsequent harvesting operations at the muster stations and abandonment of ship (in particular, by reporting only a blackout, when he was already fully aware that the ship had opened a waterway in the large size) and therefore not promoting, in case emergency, protect the physical integrity of persons on board (and therefore in breach of as provided in paragraph 4 - Operating Modes - of Annex P12.04); - By failing, after he was given the signal of a general emergency, to take action - both personally and radio - to be responsible for the evacuation of the cabins and passenger areas and crew the whole vessel, receiving updates from all the staff involved in the evacuation, communicating with the master and update it constantly (and therefore in breach of Article. 8, letter. g) Leg. 271/1999 cit., having failed to implement with diligence, the procedures in cases of emergency, particularly to abandon ship, as indicated in the current safety regulations adopted by Decree of the President of the Republic November 8, 1991, n. 435, as well as the aforementioned Role of Appeals) - however caused or contributed to cause the death of:

 

 

List of deaths and injuries

[watertheodds]

With the aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime of multiple manslaughter and negligent injury multiple in violation of the regulations for the prevention of accidents at work. In Giglio, the night between 13 and 14 January 2012.

 

 

SCHETTINO

g) 812 and 110, 112 n. 3 č.p. and 171, letter. a) and b) and 254, Leg. Aug. 19, 2005 n. 196, not to have - as master the Costa Concordia, in conjunction with Ciro Ambrosio, Andrea Bongiovanni, Simone Ca49 nessa (authors of false communications materials specified below, upon direct order of the above commander), with more executive actions of the same criminal intention - done immediately report competent maritime authorities (in particular, the Maritime Directorate of Livorno, Fitness secondary

maritime rescue - MRSC, the Port Authority of Civitavecchia and at the Local

Maritime Porto Santo Stefano) on collision with shallow water and the consequent failure, malfunctions, failures and flooding, and in general about the incident - which would affect the safety of the ship and to ensure the safety of navigation - and then vice versa have also provided the same Maritime Authority (which in the absence of dutiful reports by Costa Concordia is activated in order to obtain the necessary information, with calls VHF hours 22.01ss, speaking materially Ambrosio, hours 22.07ss, speaking materially Bongiovanni, hours 22.07ss, speaking materially Canessa, hours 22.26ss, speaking materially with Ambrosio) false information about items that do not immediately known, have created dangerous situation (in particular, minimizing the real scale of the accident, being silent about the collision, the damage and flooding of some compartments and referring only to a black-out and generally maliciously minimizing the seriousness of the facts). With the aggravating circumstance of having, in the exercise of its authority, management or supervision, determined to commit the offense persons subject to him. In Isola del Giglio, Monte Argentario, Civitavecchia and Livorno, January 13, 2012.

[watertheodds]

AMBROSIO

h) 812 and 110 č.p. and 171, letter. a) and b) and 254, Leg. Aug. 19, 2005 n. 196, to have - which mate serving on the Costa Concordia, and behind direct order of the commander, the author of the material false communications specified below, in conjunction with Francesco Schettino and more enforcement actions of a same criminal intention - provided the Port Authority of Civitavecchia before, and the Directorate Maritime Livorno, then, (which in the absence of rightful complaints from the Costa Concordia, is activated in order to obtain the necessary information, with VHF calls, respectively, of the hours 22.01se 22.26ss about, speaking materially Ambrosio) false information relating to items that, not promptly known, have created dangerous situation (in particular, minimizing the true scale of the accident, silence about the collision, the damage opening and flooding of some compartments and referring only to a black-out and generally maliciously minimizing the seriousness of the facts). In Isola del Giglio, Civitavecchia and Livorno, January 13, 2012.

 

 

SCHETTINO

k) 811 and 5911 č.p. cn and 1097, not to be dropped from the last board the Costa Concordia, the who was commander during the abandonment of the same (in danger, as being shipwreck), away - after being brought to the outdoor promenade deck 3 starboard side - no later than 00:17, climbing on the roof of a lifeboat and getting off the ground in the area immediately after Gabbianara, so while leaving hundreds of people (passengers and crew members same ship), which had to take care in his capacity as commander, unable to provide to themselves (in particular, since still on board, no effective assistance and coordination concrete, and adequate provisions, being shipwrecked - with transverse tilt significant and growing, progressive flooding of multiple local incipient risk of flooding - and night time).

[watertheodds]

In Isola del Giglio, Jan. 14, 2012 ..

 

FERRARINI

l) 402, 113 and CP 5892-4, to have - in cooperation with Francesco Schettino, Ciro Ambrosio, Jacob Rusli Bin, Silvia Coronica and Manrico Giampedroni, as the representative of Costa Crociere SpA, shipping company Costa Concordia, concerning the management of the crisis to protect the safety of persons within the meaning and for the purposes of Art. 409 cn, partly as a result of the organizational arrangements

50th on the Procedure SMS P15.6 IO 01 - Crisis Management Preparedness Plan - Operational & Reporting Procedures of Costa Crociere Spa (in particular, as Head of Marine Operations, which Fleet Crisis Coordinator and Designated Person Ashore which Costa Crociere SpA, and as a member of the Crisis Committee Shoreside, the Crisis Unit of the same company) – because consisted of carelessness, negligence and incompetence and violation of laws, regulations, orders and disciplines. In particular, and among other things: - By failing to ask the master - after he had informed him, at 21:58, the collision of leak, flooding at least one compartment until almost at the bridge 0, resulting in the blackout flooding of the main electrical panel - if it had implemented safety procedures (Specifically, the above procedure SMS P12.04 IO2) and in particular if he had given the alarm flaw activated and consequently this procedure and considering themselves to the general emergency and in any event by failing to suggest himself such activities and any other appropriate solution and in general to provide adequate technical and operational support (and therefore not working for maximum safety of persons, in violation of paragraph 1 of this procedure P15.6 SMS IO 01);

- Warning late on Crisis Managing Director of Costa Cruises, calling Manfred Ursprunger only at 22:21, after the news of the collision and the damage - events by themselves sufficient to characterize the crisis as Level 3 - had been given to 21:58 (and therefore in breach of paragraph 4.6.2 of this procedure P15.6 SMS IO 01);

- Omitting, as DPA, to inform the current crisis of the governing bodies apical Coast

Cruises, thus preventing that President-CEO / chairman and CEO Pierluigi Foschi and general manager / president John Onorato could participate, even by telephone, the work of the Crisis and could still provide promptly all necessary and take the necessary decisions (and therefore in breach of paragraph 4.5.7 of this procedure SMS P15.6 IO 01); - Providing the Fleet Maintenance Director, engineer Paolo Parodi James, who was also a member of Unity crisis, erroneous information (riferendogli with 22.1 hours of phone call that there was a flaw in the local electric motors for propulsion - PEM, whereas the previous 21:58, Francesco Schettino had clearly informed that had flooded the compartment that housed the main electrical panel and the water had almost reached the same main switchboard ie near the bridge 0) and then failing to provide subsequent updates, so as to prevent the said engineer Parodi offer the work of the Crisis actively supported the technical; - By failing to ask the master - after he had further informed, at 22.05, the total loss of propulsion, the enduring blackouts and probable progress flooding - if it had implemented safety procedures (specifically, the above SMS P12.04 procedure IO2), and in particular if he had activated all the appropriate procedures and antifalla given the general emergency and in any event by failing to suggest himself such activities and any other appropriate solution and in general to provide adequate technical and operational support (and therefore not working for maximum safety of persons, in violation of paragraph 1 of this procedure SMS P15.6 IO 01); - By failing to ask the master - after he had further informed, at 22.15, the probable flooding of at least three compartments (local diesel generators bow, local generators diesel stern and local PEM), the total loss of propulsion, the enduring blackouts and the lack of activation of the bilge pumps - if he implemented the security procedures (in Specifically, the above procedure SMS P12.04 IO2) and in particular if he had given the general emergency and if he were considering the order to abandon ship and in any event by failing to suggest himself such activities and any other appropriate solution and in general to provide adequate support technical and operational (and therefore not working to the highest safety of persons, in violation of

paragraph 1 of this procedure P15.6 SMS IO 01); - By failing to ask the master - after he had confirmed, to 22.25, the flooding of at least three compartments (local diesel generators bow, stern local diesel generators and local PEM), informing also the inclination of the ship and the increasing gravity of the situation – if had established safety procedures (specifically, the above procedure P12.04 SMS IO2), and especially if he had given the general alarm and if he was considering whether to order abandon ship and still failing to suggest that he and any other appropriate activities solution and in general to provide adequate technical and operational support (and therefore not working 51 for maximum safety of persons, in violation of paragraph 1 of this procedure SMS P15.6 IO 01); however caused or contributed to cause the death of:

 

List of deaths and injuries

[watertheodds]

This is it except for the list of defendants and their attorneys of record

 

Hope you have enjoyed this episode of As the Ship Turns.....Over.

 

 

 

 

With the aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime of multiple manslaughter and negligent injury with multiple violation of the regulations for the prevention of accidents at work. In Genoa and Isola del Giglio, the night between 13 and 14 January 2012.

 

 

 

FERRARINI

p) 192 and 254, Leg. Aug. 19, 2005 n. 196, not to have - as the representative of Costa Crociere SpA, a company shipowner of the Costa Concordia, even to protect the safety of persons within the meaning and for the purposes in art. 409 c.n. and also as a result of the organizational arrangements of the Procedure SMS P15.6 IO 01 - Crisis Management Preparedness Plan - Operational and Reporting Procedures Costa

Cruises Spa (in particular, as Head of Marine Operations, which Fleet Crisis Coordinator Designated Person Ashore and which Costa Crociere Spa, as well as a member of the Crisis Shoreside Committee, the Crisis Unit of the same company) - fully cooperated with the authorities maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences of the incident occurred at sea ship Costa Concordia

- By failing to call himself the Maritime Directorate of Livorno, Fitness secondary relief

Maritime - MRSC or with the Central Office of the General Command of the Harbor

- MARICOGECAP - while being aware of the opening of a hole (telephone conversation with Francis Schettino of 21:58) and the fact that the commander had failed first contact with the Authority Maritime (same phone call with Francesco Schettino of 21:58) and then reported to the latter a factual situation falsely reassuring and not corresponding to true (call with Francesco Schettino of 22.05) - that is still failing to make himself available to the competent Maritime authorities, providing them with all the elements necessary for a complete evaluation of the facts, so that rescuers intervened with delay (and therefore, not fully cooperating with the Maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences of the accident at sea occurred at ship Costa Concordia); - Providing the Central Office of the General Command of the Harbor - MARICOGECAP

- With the call 22:36 - news incorrect information relating to the situation of Concordia, in particular referring positive development of the situation and basically quiet on board, without, however, able to provide reliable figures regarding the number of persons on board (and therefore, not collaborating fully with the competent maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences

the incident occurred at sea ship Costa Concordia); - Providing the Central Office of the General Command of the Harbor – MARICOGECAP - With the call 22:58 - news incorrect information relating to the situation of Concordia, in particular putting on a purely doubtful the flooding of more than two compartments and generally providing information inaccurate and misleading information on the amount of water returned, and quantifying the current list Vessel in only 12 °, instead of 15 ° communicated shortly before (and therefore, not fully collaborating with the competent maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences of the incident occurred at sea ship Costa Concordia); - Providing the Central Office of the General Command of the Harbor – MARICOGECAP - With phone call of 0:41 - inaccurate news about the situation of Concordia, in particular providing inaccurate and misleading information on the exact number of persons on board (referring to, although being doubtful that all the passengers had already left the ship), denying to hear injured on board, let alone dead, back where it was already informed (and therefore not working fully with the competent maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences the incident occurred at sea ship Costa Concordia). In Genoa and elsewhere, on the night between 13 and 14 January 2012.

[Uniall]

This is it except for the list of defendants and their attorneys of record

 

Hope you have enjoyed this episode of As the Ship Turns.....Over.

 

 

 

 

With the aggravating circumstance of having committed the crime of multiple manslaughter and negligent injury with multiple violation of the regulations for the prevention of accidents at work. In Genoa and Isola del Giglio, the night between 13 and 14 January 2012.

 

 

 

FERRARINI

p) 192 and 254, Leg. Aug. 19, 2005 n. 196, not to have - as the representative of Costa Crociere SpA, a company shipowner of the Costa Concordia, even to protect the safety of persons within the meaning and for the purposes in art. 409 c.n. and also as a result of the organizational arrangements of the Procedure SMS P15.6 IO 01 - Crisis Management Preparedness Plan - Operational and Reporting Procedures Costa

Cruises Spa (in particular, as Head of Marine Operations, which Fleet Crisis Coordinator Designated Person Ashore and which Costa Crociere Spa, as well as a member of the Crisis Shoreside Committee, the Crisis Unit of the same company) - fully cooperated with the authorities maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences of the incident occurred at sea ship Costa Concordia

- By failing to call himself the Maritime Directorate of Livorno, Fitness secondary relief

Maritime - MRSC or with the Central Office of the General Command of the Harbor

- MARICOGECAP - while being aware of the opening of a hole (telephone conversation with Francis Schettino of 21:58) and the fact that the commander had failed first contact with the Authority Maritime (same phone call with Francesco Schettino of 21:58) and then reported to the latter a factual situation falsely reassuring and not corresponding to true (call with Francesco Schettino of 22.05) - that is still failing to make himself available to the competent Maritime authorities, providing them with all the elements necessary for a complete evaluation of the facts, so that rescuers intervened with delay (and therefore, not fully cooperating with the Maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences of the accident at sea occurred at ship Costa Concordia); - Providing the Central Office of the General Command of the Harbor - MARICOGECAP

- With the call 22:36 - news incorrect information relating to the situation of Concordia, in particular referring positive development of the situation and basically quiet on board, without, however, able to provide reliable figures regarding the number of persons on board (and therefore, not collaborating fully with the competent maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences

the incident occurred at sea ship Costa Concordia); - Providing the Central Office of the General Command of the Harbor – MARICOGECAP - With the call 22:58 - news incorrect information relating to the situation of Concordia, in particular putting on a purely doubtful the flooding of more than two compartments and generally providing information inaccurate and misleading information on the amount of water returned, and quantifying the current list Vessel in only 12 °, instead of 15 ° communicated shortly before (and therefore, not fully collaborating with the competent maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences of the incident occurred at sea ship Costa Concordia); - Providing the Central Office of the General Command of the Harbor – MARICOGECAP - With phone call of 0:41 - inaccurate news about the situation of Concordia, in particular providing inaccurate and misleading information on the exact number of persons on board (referring to, although being doubtful that all the passengers had already left the ship), denying to hear injured on board, let alone dead, back where it was already informed (and therefore not working fully with the competent maritime authorities, in order to minimize the consequences the incident occurred at sea ship Costa Concordia). In Genoa and elsewhere, on the night between 13 and 14 January 2012.

 

Great Job

[watertheodds]

It is quiet on the thread....everyone must be reading! two things I would like to point out. It doesn't appear anyone died from being trapped inside an elevator or that there were any malfunctions of equipment on the bridge....Costa would most certainly have been charged with ignoring maintenance issues with the equipment along with ignoring the severity of the situation at hand.

[Uniall]

It is quiet on the thread....everyone must be reading! two things I would like to point out. It doesn't appear anyone died from being trapped inside an elevator or that there were any malfunctions of equipment on the bridge....Costa would most certainly have been charged with ignoring maintenance issues with the equipment along with ignoring the severity of the situation at hand.

 

I've been going over it from both a prosecutor's mindset and defense counsel's approach. It's a classic example of "Everything but the kitchen sink" approach in prosecuting a willful and wanton and/or gross negligence and/or negligent homicide case.

 

Going though it word by word and phrase by phrase is laborious but my initial reaction is it's a very well done indictment and very damning. The appear to have an unusual "fluke" in Italian law that's not generally known in the US. The classic conspiracy case in the US requires that each co conspirator knew of the scheme or plan. But, the Federal RICO law, enacted to go after the Mafia is one of the few US laws that allows people to be found guilty merely for working in concert with the higher ups even if they had no knowledge of the scheme. It's ironic the law was intended to fight the Mafia and it appears Italy uses the same theory for criminal laws. I find that possiblity very intriguing

[SomeBeach]

Great Job

 

Yeah, what he said.

Thanks for bringing this to us.

That is a boat load of charges.

I agree about Giamperdoni. It seems they are saying he should have ignored the Captain and been responsible to the passengers.

Noted that nobody died trapped in the elevators.

Also noted that they suggest the Captain "climbed" onto the roof of lifeboat.

[SomeBeach]

I've been going over it from both a prosecutor's mindset and defense counsel's approach. It's a classic example of "Everything but the kitchen sink" approach in prosecuting a willful and wanton and/or gross negligence and/or negligent homicide case.

 

Going though it word by word and phrase by phrase is laborious but my initial reaction is it's a very well done indictment and very damning. The appear to have an unusual "fluke" in Italian law that's not generally known in the US. The classic conspiracy case in the US requires that each co conspirator knew of the scheme or plan. But, the Federal RICO law, enacted to go after the Mafia is one of the few US laws that allows people to be found guilty merely for working in concert with the higher ups even if they had no knowledge of the scheme. It's ironic the law was intended to fight the Mafia and it appears Italy uses the same theory for criminal laws. I find that possiblity very intriguing

 

I was trying to figure out how to ask if some of those charges meant that following the Captain's order got the other Officers in more trouble. I think what I highlighted gives me the answer.

They were between a rock and a hard place with the Master is in control; if in doubt, ask the Master.

[SomeBeach]

The term in that Giglio News article "carcass of the Costa Concordia" made me think of a dead whale washed up on shore.

 

I found the use of that word unusal.

I know some of you do not go to the other Concordia thread.

FYI: starting with post 3141 there are translated posts with the charges against Schettino and other officers. Also included is a list of where the passengers were located.

[cruiserfanfromct]

Lies, lies and more lies.

 

His arrogance and lies have no bounds!

 

Hear the story of how Schettino ended up in a lifeboat -- he no longer tripped and fell. The reason he he gives as to why he was on the rocks (caught on infrared camera) is that the lifeboat's engine failed and that is where they landed -- HA! --this is after he says he saved a dozen people by steering the lifeboat away from the listing ship. Where are did these dozen people go and why are they not on the rocks with him if the engine failed? Why is it there is only Schettino and a few crew members on the rocks? He goes on to say he tried to get a boat to go over to the other side but the sea was too rough -- HA! -- funny how the Coast Guard was able to get to the side with the ladder (why didn't he try to get on one of the CG boats?) and help the hundreds of passengers he abandoned while watching the tragedy unfold safely on the rocks.

 

He should stick with one story and stop changing it with every interview. I'm surprised he is even giving interviews with the indictment handed down and a possible trial on the way packed with myriad charges against him. Bad move!

 

Hear him in the 2nd of the 2-part exclusive interview: :eek:

 

http://www.wsvn.com/features/articles/carmelcase/MI97398/

Edited March 6, 2013 by cruiserfanfromct

[sidari]

The weather looks really bad today .... :(

[SomeBeach]

I would not want to be his lawyer. First he tripped, then he fell, and now he jumped. :rolleyes:

However he left the ship isn't as important as what happened to start this chain of events. I believe he'll be convicted more on the basis of negligence to duty than abandoning the ship.

[watertheodds]

I suspect the dozen people he "saved" were his partners in crime on the bridge and as soon as they got to the rocks most of them abandoned him. If any passengers had been on a lifeboat with the captain I would think there would have been a story to sell. I am not even sure it was one of the standard lifeboats but a small raft which makes more sense to me.

[MDSue]

I suspect the dozen people he "saved" were his partners in crime on the bridge and as soon as they got to the rocks most of them abandoned him. If any passengers had been on a lifeboat with the captain I would think there would have been a story to sell. I am not even sure it was one of the standard lifeboats but a small raft which makes more sense to me.

Yeah, If his story is true, I'm surprised none of the people have ome forward to back up his claims.