Heidi13

It may vary by company, especially now with many cruise lines and large ferry operations having a 24/7 operations centre. Back in my day (pre-Ops Centre) once I Tx a "Mayday" the Coast Radio Station/Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) contacted the vessel directly requesting details of the situation and any assistance required. As Master, I would also call the DPA, who would activate the shore response and liaise with the Coast Guard. All ship/shore radio communications were with RCC, not the Coast Guard. Once resolved, if it was a reportable incident, as per the Shipping Casualty Reporting Regulations, I had 24 hrs to make a verbal report to a Coast Radio Station and then complete a written report on the prescribed form.

The Costa Concordia incident sadly proves the negative issues with your expectations. Had the incident been effectively managed the vessel would have been safely beached or all pax and crew safely evacuated by survival craft. Due to the incompetence of the person masquerading as the vessel's Master, who departed the vessel early, a number of people sadly lost their lives. If you were aboard that vessel, you may have been one of the lucky pax that got into a survival craft or entered the water. However, you could just as easily have been one of the ones that perished. If the vessel had a competent Master, there should not have been any requirement for any crew or pax to enter the water. They should all have been safely evacuated by survival craft. Personally, when I am aboard a vessel, I prefer a competent Master that will effectively manage any emergency situation. In the unlikely event of an "Abandon Ship" order being required, the pax have a significantly higher chance of being safely evacuated when the Master oversees the operation from the Bridge and is one of the last, if not the last person off the ship. Don't forget, a ship is a hierarchical command structure and when you remove the "Leader" the subordinates may flounder. This is more common in a well drilled emergency situation, where crew perform as they trained in drills. Therefore, every pax should prefer the Master to be aboard until every pax is evacuated.

The culture shift into Bridge Resource Management was a process that really interested me, so I bought into it fairly early. Overall, as a Master it made my job easier, as the officers were more alert and motivated. Having been brought up in the P&O system on their cruise ships, in my experience, nobody questioned the Captain. On SS Oriana, I recall one day walking along a pax alleyway and noted the Captain coming the opposite direction. He didn't miss a step, barreled down the middle of the alleyway and never even acknowledged the lowly Cadet, who had to dive into an alcove. On the Bridge, Junior Officers and Cadets were to be seen but not heard. The marine industry Bridge Resource Management (BRM) was taken from the airline industry CRM, which was developed after the Pan-Am/KLM runway disaster in Tenerife. My first knowledge of the marine BRM was from Princess/P&O/Cunard in early 2000's. I still knew a number of the Masters and then our son joined Princess in 2002, as a Deck Cadet. I was provided a copy of their latest Bridge Team Command and Control (BTCC) draft. When I assumed the management of one of the company's largest vessels, I discussed the BTCC with my 3 Masters, and they were all happy to give it a try. I slowly introduced the BTCC program and it worked well. It included closed-loop communications, eliminated the potential for single person errors, encouraged the Master to oversee navigation and dockings and created an environment, where even the ratings could respectfully question the officers or Master. The company then bought into the process and hired a British company, who also worked for P&O/Princess. We received Human Factors and Risk Management training, which confirmed and expanded the knowledge I had received from extensive research. I was then tasked by the VP Ops to develop new Level 2 ISM Deck Operations procedures incorporating the latest BRM standards. I completed this project just before I retired, but note it is still in use, 12 years later. From my first command in 1985 to when I retired in 2012, the culture change was enormous. In 1985 I personally docked the ship 16 times per day. In 2012, when I relieved as Master for a shift, I never did a docking or departure. All ship handling was completed by the Deck Officers, some who needed no mentoring and others that needed considerable mentoring.

With the detailed procedures in the Safety Management System, it is certainly easier to determine that the Master is in non-compliance. Although many decisions are still highly subjective, when 3 compartments are compromised on a 2-compartment vessel, the vessel must be beached or it will sink. Therefore, the Master must take the required actions to ensure pax and crew safety. First and foremost this would be calling all pax to the Assembly Stations, where preparations can commence for abandoning the vessel. The Staff Captain should review the SMS requirements with the Master, and suggest the correct actions. If the Master is unable/unwilling to act, then the Staff Captain should act. Yes, it is a tough situation, especially with Costa, who allegedly had not bought into the Bridge Resource Management procedures used by other Carnival Brands. Back in my days as a Chief Officer, I had 2 issues where the Master was unsure of the waters departing a shipyard. Both Masters accepted my more recent experience and willingly accepted my suggestions.

That is also my understanding.

You may want to consider the age of the article you quoted, as Mark Collins was fired by BC Ferries almost 2 years ago - cant remember the exact month, but recall early summer 2022. As I posted earlier today, Transport Canada has eased the requirements for some foreign CoC holders to acquire a Canadian CoC, but foreign CoC's still cannot work on Canadian tonnage. They have also reduced the citizenship requirements from landed immigrant to a work permit. However, Mark Collins didn't discuss the BC Ferries familiarisation requirements, which to the best of my knowledge, have not changed and are quite onerous. The HR department can hire them, but operations may not deem them suitable for vessel operations. Since BC Ferries sailings are still being cancelled due to lack of crew, I'll suggest the Mark Collins statement was no more than PR propoganda.

Yes, foreign-flagged tonnage sail in coastal waters, as permitted by UNCLOS, but they all have local coastal pilots aboard the vessel when the route is more challenging. Foreign certificates of competency are NOT permitted aboard a Canadian flagged vessel. Until recently, Transport Canada did not recognise any foreign CoC and required those with foreign certificates to acquire a Canadian CoC. To address the mariner shortage, Transport Canada are now simplifying the process of acquiring a Canadian CoC. Our son is a classic example. As a dual citizen of Canada and UK, he opted for the vastly superior UK FG Master CoC. This permits him to sail worldwide on any tonnage, but even as a Canadian citizen, he cannot sail on a Canadian flagged vessel. Until recently, he would have to take all of the exams to acquire a Canadian certificate. Now they are reducing the number of exams required.

Once it was confirmed more than 2 compartments were compromised, the Master should have issued a "Mayday", at which time a Coast Radio Station would have responded to determine the assistance required.

In the event the Master is unable to command, the Staff Captain assumes Command. Another consideration is that although ships retain a hierarchical structure, modern Bridge Team Command & Control procedures encourage all officers to question any decision, if they are unsure. Unfortunately, at the time of the Concordia incident, I do not believe the Costa Bridge Teams had bought into the Bridge Resource Management procedures developed by, and in use on the P&O/Princess/Cunard ships. Even if junior officers were not comfortable questioning the Master, the Staff Captain most certainly should have. When aware the hull was compromised and the Master did not sound the GES, I would have expected the Staff Captain and Senior Bridge Watchkeepers to at least provide suggestions on mustering pax at the Assembly Stations. When advised 3 compartments were compromised, the Staff Captain and Senior Bridge Watchkeepers should have been increasingly insistent on both mustering pax and transmitting a "Mayday". If no safe beaching location was identified and 3 compartments were holed, the Staff Captain would be well within his professional responsibilities to assume Command, if the Master was clearly not providing the required leadership.

I used to work for Princess, having completed 2 Alaska seasons as navigator. However, you could not pay me now to suffer a Princess Cruise, since the standards have significantly eroded. However, you are not comparing apples to apples, as Princess is a mega ship mainstream cruise line, while Viking is a smaller vessel premium cruise line. May I suggest you to need to determine your preferences for cruising, by developing a Statement of Requirements, and then conduct some research on which cruise line and itinerary best meets your needs.

There is no Maritime Law that expects the Master to go down with the vessel. In fact, the Master is responsible and accountable for the safety of the vessel, cargo and the entire ship's compliment, which includes the Master. Being in overall Command and Control, the Master has a number of Senior Officers and Managers who manage individual components of the emergency response. Unless the Bridge is compromised, the best location for the Master is the Bridge. During an emergency, the Master is still responsible for navigating the vessel and collision avoidance. Tough tasks to perform from a position where you could "Fall" into a survival craft (lifeboat). The Master has officers and ratings on the Bridge to assist with internal/external communications and propulsion control/navigation. He/she has other officers in charge of engineering, emergency response, preparing survival craft, mustering pax, etc. This is best accomplished from the Bridge, which has excellent communications, both internal and external. Once the Master determines the situation warrants the mustering of pax to the Assembly Stations, he/she orders sounding the General Emergency Signal ( at least 7 short + 1 prolonged ring on the General Alarm). In the Concordia incident, I would have done this immediately after the grounding. If not already sounded, it SHOULD have been sounded immediately after the Master was advised of 3 compartments breeched. At that point the Master should have been looking for a safe area to beach the vessel. With 4 compartments breached, if a safe beaching area was not available, it would have been prudent to immediately order the orderly movement of pax from the Assembly Stations to the Survival Craft. At that point, I would have issued the order to Abandon Ship, after discussing the situation with the Chief Engineer, to determine the resources he/she required to manage the flooding and resultant issues. All other crew would be released from Emergency Stations to Abandon Ship Stations. At this point, the Master should remain on the Bridge, managing the evacuation through the designated Officers and Managers. The Master receives information regarding the status of mustering pax and crew members, so would be aware of any unaccounted for, and efforts being taken to locate. Once all pax are evacuated, they would commence with the remaining crew members, using any remaining lifeboats and liferafts. The Bridge should receive updated counts of those evacuated off the vessel. As the evacuation of all less essential crew is complete, the Master would then have a call with the Chief Engineer to evacuate the machinery spaces and get all remaining crew to the liferafts. The Master may remain aboard with key Deck & Engineering Officers, if they have a reasonable chance of saving the vessel, otherwise the Master will be in the last raft with the logbook and other key documents.

Yes, the Captain is clearly in overall command, but the Purser/Hotel Manager is not responsible for the evacuation of the crew and pax. The Purser/Hotel Manager directs the hotel crew responsible for mustering the pax, following the orders of the Master. In the event of an evacuation, the Survival Craft Stations are managed by an Officer, most likely a Deck Officer, but could be an Engineering Officer. BTW - there is NO signal for abandon ship, it is a verbal command issued by the Master, or his/her designate. The Master will only issue the Abandon Ship Order, when the risk of remaining aboard the vessel exceeds the risk of abandoning the vessel. Lets also not forget, more people have been killed/seriously injured by Survival Craft than have been saved by them. The biggest issue on Concordia, was the Master did not sound the General Emergency Signal to muster pax at the Assembly Stations, immediately after the grounding and especially after being advised the hull was breached.

Further to the exceptional posts from our resident Chief Engineer, while not an American, I can provide examples from serving as a Master on Cabotage tonnage in Canadian Waters. Yes, we have similar Acts, as do most maritime nations. As a Senior Master for many years, I have been provided hundreds of candidates to familiarise with the vessel and route navigation. All candidates had valid certificates of competency and were cleared to sail on any foreign-flagged vessel, up to the rank of their certification. I have experienced numerous foreign-going Masters with many years of command experience, who I wouldn't even consider as my most junior officer - 3rd Officer. I recall a ULCC Master, who could not adapt to coastal navigation, as every time he saw another vessel he wanted to slow down. This was in waters over 1 mile wide, which we considered open ocean. If he could have been retrained, it would have taken many, many years, before he could be left on the Bridge alone as a junior watchkeeper. This individual could never accept our routine of navigating a narrow channel with 2 ninety degree turns and high tides at 20 kts. We did this 8 times per day. All of my many rejects are operating FoC ships. Without the Cabotage Acts, these officers and Masters could be operating ships sailing in local coastal waters and harbours. Are you prepared to accept the significant increase in accidents and the resultant coastal pollution to eliminate the Cabotage Acts. Based on my 30 + years sailing these waters, I most certainly am not in favour.

In Rosyth, the ships docks on the north shore, after passing underneath both Forth Road Bridges and the Railway Bridge. The berth is just before the lock entrance to the basin. If you are hiring a car, you should be able to drive to the RY at Leith in 1/2 hr. While I have driven the road many times, I have never looked for parking, so will need to rely on one of the locals to assist with availability of parking. Rosyth has a train station at the north end of town, but it isn't on the main Aberdeen to London line, so I have no idea how many trains head to Edinburgh Waverly. North and South Queensferry are both on the mainline, so I expect have more trains stopping. I suggest checking the Network Rail site and checking which station has service when you want to head into Edinburgh. A taxi from the port to the station would be your best best, unless Viking has a shuttle. North Queensferry is closer, but the mainline express trains rarely stop there, probably only the local trains. From Edinburgh Waverly Station, you can get a city bus outside the station down to Leith, which stops at the Royal Yacht. Depending on connections, should take 35 - 45 mins.

Apologies for the delayed response. Just read the post. With respect to the alarms sounded, I am not aware of the crew signals used by Oceania. Therefore, unable to comment on the 3 or 4 activations of the crew alarm, especially as it didn't specify short or prolonged. The sounding of the whistle is unusual, as that is most commonly used for manoeuvring signals and man overboard. However, as should be promulgated in the embarkation drill, pax should not be concerned with any of the crew signals, only the General Emergency Signal, which is at least 7 short rings followed by a prolonged ring. Without further information it would be impossible to speculate as the the reason for a power outage, especially without knowing the entire scope. Was it a total blackout or brown out? Since it was resolved quickly, I suspect it wasn't propulsion related and probably as the Captain mentioned, a failure in a single distribution panel.